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REFUSALS TO WORK AND UNION OBJECTIVES
IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF TAFT-HARTLEY
AND UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION
Daniel R. Mandelker*
Recognition that protection against the economic consequences of
wage loss is a legitimate aim of government has brought with it the
imposition of work refusal requirements to define properly the scope of
the protection to be afforded. In unemployment compensation, for ex-
ample, the claimant who unreasonably refuses new work is denied bene-
fits. While theoretically easy to understand, work refusal tests prove dif-
ficult to apply. If too severe a limit is placed on the freedom allowed the
unemployed worker in rejecting or accepting an offer of new employ-
ment, statutory policy objectives may be frustrated. An applicant for
unemployment compensation may be offered a job vacant because of a
labor dispute. If he is a union member, he may understandably reject
the offer because of his reluctance to act as a strikebreaker. When a
union on strike is engaged in permissible concerted activities,' its con-
duct is sanctioned under the National Labor Relations Act. Putting
pressure on the compensation applicant to take the strike-created posi-
tion would undermine a protected union position.
In the case just put the applicant can refuse the offered job under the
explicit terms of the compensation statutes.2 But many other work offers
raise similar union-related problems, most of which the unemployment
compensation statutes do not explicitly resolve. A work refusal test is
also applied to union members seeking reinstatement and back pay under
the National Labor Relations Act, although its use in this context may
frustrate other statutory objectives of the Taft-Hartley Law. This article
will analyze the work refusal tests in Taft-Hartley and in unrmployment
compensation in terms of the union objectives accorded recognition in
the federal labor law. These interrelationships have been imperfectly
recognized and inadequately resolved, both in statutory provisions and in
judicial and administrative decisions, and an attempt will be made to sug-
gest a more adequate accommodation of the policies expressed in these
two programs.3
* See Contributors' Section, p. 558, for biographical data.
1 Cox, "The Right to Engage in Concerted Activities," 26 Ind. L.J. 320 (1951).
2 See the discussion in the text at note 78, infra. In fact, the job could be refused even
though the strike were not protected by the federal labor law.
3 In the discussion that follows, no attempt will be made to differentiate between
potentially different applications of the compensation law in periods of low as compared
with high unemployment. That tighter standards are imposed on the employee during a
recession, see Moseley, "Availability for Work in a Recession," Emp. Sec. Rev. Vol. 25,
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COMPARATIVE PRECEDENT: WORK REFUSALS AT COMMON LAW AND
UNDER THE POOR LAW PROGRAMS
Part of the difficulty in achieving a more adequate synthesis is due to
an absence of agreement as to the statutory function of the work refusal
requirement. Work refusal requirements first developed as a corollary to
the duty to mitigate damages in actions for wages at common law,
brought by employees who had been wrongfully discharged, and as a
factor in the determination of need under the poor relief programs dating
from the Elizabethan statute of 1597. A comparison of common law
mitigation with the poor law presents two extremes in the application of
the work refusal requirement to individual preferences. While the major-
ity position at common law gives the employee considerable latitude, in
poor relief the applicant has almost no option.4
The familiar explanation places the employee's duty to mitigate on the
point that the suit functions solely to compensate him for losses actually
incurred,5 although several opinions choose a broader policy basis to rely
on.6 They note that the mitigation requirement imposes a penalty on the
employee who chooses to remain "willfully" idle.' In so doing it serves
No. 8, p. 5 (August, 1958). Contra, Tung-Sol Electric Inc. v. Board of Review, 34 NJ.
Super. 349, 112 A.2d 571 (1955) (interpreting availability for work requirement). Perhaps
the difficulties experienced by unions during a period of heavy unemployment should
encourage an interpretation that is unusually sensitive to the union position.
4 Consider also the analogy offered by suits for wages by public officers and employees
who are wrongfully discharged. In the case of the public employee the contract analogy
is used and he is required to mitigate. But the public officer need not do so because his
compensation is conferred by law, as an incident of the office. Fitzsimmons v. City of
Brooklyn, 102 N.Y. 536, 7 N.E. 787 (1886); Vega v. Borough of Burgettstown, 394 Pa. 406,
147 A.2d 620 (1959); Note, 150 A.L.R. 100 (1944). Is there a sufficient reason for not
applying the mitigation principle to officers? Consider the reasons for the principle, as
outlined in the text. If rights to compensation conferred by statute escape the application
of the mitigation requirement then this requirement should be equally inapplicable to the
Taft-Hartey and unemployment compensation statutes, at least in the absence of a
provision to the contrary.
5 E.g., Hussey v. Holloway, 217 Mass. 100, 104 N.E. 471 (1914); Hendrickson v. Ander-
son, 50 N.C. 246 (1858); McKean v. Cowley, 7 L.T.R. (n.s.) 828 (Ex. 1863).
6 To some extent the private nature of the cause of action is important. For example, a
wrongfully discharged employee need not accept an offer of re-employment from the
employer who discharged him. To require him to do so would force a modification of
the original contract, which the employee may refuse. E.g., Miller v. Abraham, 159 Ark.
493, 252 S.W. 15 (1923) ; Billetter v. Posell, 94 Cal. App. 2d 858, 211 P.2d 621 (1949);
Note, 45 W. Va. L. Rev. 378 (1939). On the other hand, there is no such impediment to
the employee's acceptance of an offer of re-employment in satisfaction of his duty to find
work under the unemployment compensation laws. And non-discriminatory re-employment
by the employer will wash out a discriminatory discharge under the Taft-Hartey Act,
although back pay might be awarded to the date of the rehire.
7 Wilkinson v. Black, 80 Ala. 329 (1885); Miller v. Mariner's Church, 7 Me. 51 (1830);
Huntington v. Ogdensburgh & Lake Champlain R.R. Co., 33 How. Pr. 416 (N.Y. 1867);
Polk v. Daly, 14 Abb. Pr. (ns.) 156 (N.Y.C.P. 1873); James v. Allen County, 44 Ohio
St. 226, 6 N.E. 246 (1886). Cf. Williams v. Anderson, 9 Minn. 50 (1864) (rule questioned).
Because the recent cases seldom examine the reasons behind the mitigation rules, the early
cases have bad to be explored.
Of some interest is the theory that damages suffered by the employee through a failure
to mitigate are too "remote" and therefore not recoverable under conventional rules of
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"morality" by discouraging idleness and by preventing a "fraud" against
the employer. But there are limits to the employee's responsibility. Be-
ginning with an early dictum in 18468 the courts have required the em-
ployee to look only for work of a similar nature.' Most cases accept this
rule uncritically. When reasons are given, it is usually that the employer
is the wrongdoer," that the employee has the "right" to pursue the occu-
pation of his choice," or that the contrary rule would deprive the em-
ployee of the promise of the original contract, in terms of the type of
work to be performed."2
Some decisions adopt the opposite view, and require the employee
suing at common law to "lower his sights" after a reasonable period of
time and to search for employment different from that for which he con-
tracted.' 3 Reasons for the minority position have not been forthcoming
either, except for a suggestion 4 that the common law duty to mitigate,
proximate cause. Perry v. Simpson Waterproof Mfg. Co., 37 Conn. 520 (1871); McClelland
v. Climax Hosiery Mills, 252 N.Y. 347, 169 N.E. 605 (1930) (concurring opinion of
Cardozo, J.).
8 Costigan v. Mohawk & Hudson R.R. Co., 2 Denio 609 (N.Y. 1846), a leading case
which is frequently cited. Compare Byrd v. Boyd, 4 McCord 246 (S.C. 1827), where the
court is uncertain even of the duty to mitigate.
9 E.g., Standard Oil Co. v. Lloyd, 26 Ala. App. 306, 159 So. 371 (1935); Van Winkle
v. Satterfield, 58 Ark. 617, 25 S.W. 1113 (1894); Gregg v. McDonald, 73 Cal. App. 748,
239 Pac. 373 (1925); Hinchcliffe v. Koontz, 121 Ind. 422, 23 N.E. 271 (1890); Bertholf
v. Fisk, 182 Iowa 1308, 166 N.W. 713 (1918); Edgecomb v. Traverse City School Dist.,
341 Mich. 106, 67 N.W.2d 87 (1954); Bang v. Internat'l Sisal Co., 212 Minn. 135, 4 N.W.2d
113 (1942); Tenzer v. Gilmore, 114 Mo. App. 210, 89 S.W. 341 (1905); Stoffel v. Metcalfe
Constr. Co., 145 Neb. 450, 17 N.W.2d 3 (1945); State ex rel. Freeman v. Sierra County
Bd. of Educ., 49 N.M. 54, 157 P.2d 234 (1945); King & Graham v. Steiren, 44 Pa. 99
(1862) ; Publishing Co. v. Burger, 2 Tenn. C.C.A. 179 (1911); Martin v. Board of Educ.,
120 W. Va. 621, 199 S.E. 887 (1938); State ex rel. Schmidt v. District No. 2, 237 Wis.
186, 295 N.W. 36 (1940) ; Silver v. Standard Gold Mines Ltd., 3 D.L.R. 103 (Que. Super. Ct.
1912). See also McCormick, Damages § 160 (1935); Notes, 28 A.L.R. 736 (1924), 141
A.L.R. 662 (1942).
30 Williams v. Leaf Tobacco Co., 293 Ky. 270, 168 S.W.2d 570 (1943). To work a
presumption against the wrongdoer is a common principle in damages law. This presump-
tion also serves as the basis for the rule often adopted that puts the burden of proof to
show a failure to mitigate on the employer. E.g., Koenigkraemer v. Missouri Glass Co.,
24 Mo. App. 124 (1887); Emery v. Steckel, 126 Pa. 111, 17 Atl. 601 (1889). Compare
the suggestion that unemployment compensation is predicated on employer "fault."
11 Taylor v. Pope, 259 S.W. 527 (Mo. App. 1924). Cf. American Trading Co. v. Steele,
274 Fed. 774 (9th Cir. 1921) (need not accept employment which "would affect injuriously
his own future career") ; Crabtree v. Elizabeth Arden Sales Corp., 105 N.Y.S.2d 40 (Sup.
Ct. N.Y. County 1951), aff'd, 279 App. Div. 992, 112 N.Y.S.2d 494 (1st Dep't 1952), aff'd
on other grounds, 305 N.Y. 48, 110 N.E.2d 551 (1953).
12 Strauss v. Meertief, 64 Ala. 299 (1879); Cooper v. Stronge & Warner Co., 111 Minn.
177, 126 N.W. 541 (1910).
'i Perry v. Simpson Waterproof Mfg. Co., 37 Conn. 520 (1871). But cf. Grant v. New
Departure Mfg. Co., 85 Conn. 421, 83 At. 212 (1912). The Texas cases have vacillated.
Compare Texas Life Ins. Co. v. Roberts, 55 Tex. Civ. App. 217, 119 S.W. 926 (1909),
and Simon v. Allen & Co., 76 Tex. 398, 13 S.W. 296 (1890), with Weber Gas Co. v.
Bradford, 34 Tex. Civ. App. 543, 79 S.W. 46 (1904). For a qualified acceptance of
the minority view see Torson Constr. Co. v. Grant, 251 Ky. 800, 66 S.W.2d 79 (1933).
But see note 10, supra. Cf. Ransome Concrete Machinery Co. v. Moody, 282 Fed. 29
(2d Cir. 1922).
14 Perry v. Simpson Waterproof Mfg. Co., 37 Conn. 520 (1871).
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consistently applied, requires the employee to look for work at a lower
wage if employment at the promised amount cannot be found.
In sum, the common law cases dealing with the employee's duty to
mitigate in his action for wrongful discharge present a mixture of private
fault and social policy, of employer wrongdoing and discouragement of
idleness, that are reflected in subsequent statutory programs. However,
the majority of courts at common law did draw a line at forcing the em-
ployee into less desirable employment, 5 although even the majority rule
would permit some flexibility in administration as to the wage and occu-
pation.' 6 Probably because most of the common law cases did not in-
volve the organized worker, only one decision arose in a union context.
In San Antonio & A. P. R. R. Co. v. Collins,'7 an employee was upheld in
his refusal to take a work re-assignment in another city that would have
involved a loss of seniority and position under his collective bargaining
contract.' 8
Common law mitigation, perhaps because it is employed in the enforce-
ment of "rights" under contracts, tends to respect the employee's decision
to accept or reject new work. Poor relief programs' 9 make different as-
15 Of some interest here is the additional requirement at common law that the employee
use reasonable diligence in seeking work. Compare Polk v. Daly, 14 Abb. Pr. (n.s.) 156
(N.Y.C.P. 1873), with Milage v. Woodward, 186 N.Y. 252, 78 N.E. 873 (1906). The
requirement is substantially the same as the statutory provision now common in unemploy-
ment compensation that requires the claimant to make an "active" search for work. Bureau
of Employment Security, U.S. Dep't of Labor, Comparison of State Unemployment
Insurance Laws as of January 1, 1958, 84 (1958).
16 Hussey v. Holloway, 217 Mass. 100, 104 N.E. 471 (1914): It is for the jury to
determine whether the employee could refuse a job at $15 a week in an inferior position
when she had been making $18-20 a week and expected early re-employment at her regular
occupation and salary. Compare the statement of the rule in Pond v. Wyman, 15 Mo.
176 (1851).
17 61 S.W.2d 84 (Tex. Comm'n Appeals 1933).
18 In fact the employee was a member of a union other than the union which had
negotiated the contract. This was the source of his difficulties.
19 Work refusals present a problem under the related categorical assistance programs,
which are also based on need. However, since these programs cover individuals whose
capacity to work is limited because of old age, blindness or other disability, their recipients
present different problems than the able-bodied claimant temporarily out of work who
seeks help from the unemployment compensation or poor law, and to whom this study
has been limited.
Aid to Dependent Children (ADC) furnishes an example of the type of work refusal
problem than can arise under categorical assistance. The eligibility of children under this
program may be predicated on the incapacity of the father. Belknap, "An Analysis and
Criticism of the Program of Aid to Dependent Children," 6 J. Pub. L. 25, 34-39 (1957).
Belknap notes the California policy that discontinues aid after the parent's continued and
deliberate refusal to cooperate in plans to accept employment. For the statutory basis for
this policy see Cal. Welfare & Inst. Code § 1532.6 (Supp. 1957).
Problems will arise in the definition of incapacity whenever the disability of the parent
is less than total, or whenever its physical basis is not familiar. For example, in Barnes
v. Turner, 280 S.W.2d 185 (Ky. 1955), the father had a long history of allergy, which
seemed to have a psychiatric basis. He had not worked for a considerable time, although
he was apparently able to do some light work. The court affirmed an administrative deter-
mination that the father was not incapacitated; limitations on the parent's ability to
compete freely in the labor market should not shift the burden of supporting his children
to the state. Compare Barnes v. Barrett, 302 S.W.2d 385 (Ky. 1957). Here the court
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sumptions. Many statutes and administrators limit poor relief to unem-
ployables, 0 and when aid is given to the able-bodied the work refusal
test functions as part of the determination of need to insure that help
will not be given to the "sturdy beggar." This approach reflects a social
attitude that taints with moral fault and views with suspicion those
individuals who have to apply for aid,2 and who are said merely to seek
a benefit that the state is "privileged" to give or withhold.2"
A recent survey of general assistance practices found that when aid
was given to employables the applicant was invariably referred to the
local employment office.23 Several statutes provide more directly that aid
will not be given to individuals who refuse employment, 24 though some-
times with a limitation to persons physically able to work.25 On the issue
of the type of job which the applicant must accept, a few statutes are
silent.26 Two require that the job be "suitable" but do not define this
term,27 while a few require that the job pay the prevailing wage,- or that
the conditions of employment be reasonable.29 Nothing is said about
union objectives, apart from an occasional provision that allows the ap-
ilicant for relief to refuse a job that is vacant because of a labor dispute.3
affirmed an administrative finding of incapacity. This father was physically capable of
doing work, but the opinion recites that an underlying neurosis kept him idle. The court
merely found that at the present time and from a "practical standpoint" the man was
incapacitated.
Categorical assistance thus complements unemployment compensation. The incapacitated
applicant is not available for work and so is not eligible for unemployment compensation.
Freeman, "Able to Work and Available for Work," 55 Yale L.J. 123 (1945). But he
may be eligible for categorical assistance. Conversely, the Barnes case would indicate that
the children of the "available" parent are not eligible for ADC.
20 See Mandelker, "The Need Test in General Assistance," 41 Va. L. Rev. 893, 907, 908
(1955). The first English poor law was limited to employables. Poor Law, 1597, 39 Eliz.
1, c. 3.
21 See Brown, "Public Relief 1929-1939," at 224, 225 (1940).
22 See Mandelker, "Judicial Review in General Assistance," 6 J. Pub. L. 100 (1957).
23 Gentile & Howard, "General Assistance" 8 (1949). This may be required by statute
or regulation. See, e.g., the Ohio statute cited in note 24, infra; Minn. Public Welfare
Manual § 2534 (Department of Public Welfare, November 4, 1953); Utah Regulations,
Employable Assistance § 4472 (Department of Public Welfare, June 1, 1954).
24 Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 46-233(4) (1956); Cal. Welfare & Inst. Code § 2864 (Supp.
1957) (Emergency Relief Law); Ill. Ann. Stat. c. 23, § 401 (1958); Ind. Ann. Stat. § 52-152
(Burns 1951); Mich. Stat. Ann. § 16.455(2) (e) (Supp. 1957); NJ. Rev. Stat. § 40:8-108
(Supp. 1958); § 44:1-94 (1940); N.D. Rev. Code § 50-0118 (1943); Ohio Rev. Code
§ 5113.04 (1953). For a similar requirement imposed administratively see, e.g., R.I.
Public Assistance Service Manual § 201.2, p. 4 (November 15, 1951).
25 For example, the Michigan statute applies to persons "mentally and physically able
to work."
26 Arizona (shall not refuse "available" employment); North Dakota. Under the Indiana
law the applicant cannot refuse work paying a "reasonable" compensation. But he is also
directed to accept any work payable in money or in kind, apparently without regard to
the suitability of the employment. See N.J. Rev. Stat. § 48:8-108 (Supp. 1958) ("willing
to work but . . .unable to secure employment").
27 California (suitability to be defined by state department) ; Illinois. Cf. N.J-: Rev. Stat.
§ 44:1-94 ("proper" employment).
28 E.g., Michigan.
29 Indiana (alternative requirement); Ohio.
30 California, Ohio.
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No judicial interpretations of these statutes have been found, but the
available evidence indicates that the work refusal requirement in poor
relief is administered in terms of minimizing the relief load, without much
consideration of individual preferences. This is so in spite of a study
during the depression of the 1930's, indicating that only about 3% of the
reported refusals of relief applicants to accept jobs were unjustified.3 1
The explanation lies in the nature of the program. Poor relief grants
aim at the guarantee of aid at a subsistence level;3" higher standards
cannot be expected in the administration of the work refusal require-
ment.a3
TAYT-HARTLEY: THE FEDERAL LABOR LAW
When work refusal requirements appear in social legislation, the statu-
tory intent does not always indicate whether the majority rule at common
law or whether the subsistence standard of the poor law is to be ap-
plied.34 In the case of the National Labor Relations Act, differing atti-
tudes in the courts and in the National Labor Relations Board contribute
to the failure to establish an accepted base from which this requirement
can be administered.
Reinstatement problems under Taft-Hartley can arise in two contexts.
Workers on strike may be entitled to reinstatement depending on the
reason for the activity and the action taken by their employer. If the em-
ployees strike over an employer unfair labor practice, they are entitled to
31 Arthur, "Summary Study of Alleged job Refusals by Relief Persons" 6 (FERA 1936).
Of 603 job refusals studied, only 20 were classified as unjustified. The writer reports one
case, involving what to him are extenuating circumstances, in which an applicant who was
a union member refused a job at one-half the union scale because it would have meant the
loss of union membership and would have jeopardized his future employment. This and
other cases involving extenuating circumstances comprised 17% of the job refusals studied,
so that a substantial number of job refusals in poor relief involved discretionary evaluations
of suitability by the applicant.
32 Mention should also be made of the vagrancy laws, which appeared early in English
and American history and which imposed penalties on able-bodied workers who left their
home communities to seek better opportunity elsewhere. The first such law was apparently
12 Rich. 2, c. 3 (1388). Even today, the vagrancy laws are still used in some areas as a
club to force able-bodied men to work. Gentile & Howard "General Assistance," 8 (1949).
At least two states define the refusal of an able-bodied person to work as vagrancy. N.D.
Rev. Code § 50-0118 (1943); Ore. Rev. Stat. § 166.060(1) (a) (1957). Vagrancy prosecu-
tions for work refusals might also be brought under the customary statute defining a
vagrant as any person living in idleness with no visible means of support. See Lacey,
"Vagrancy and Other Crimes of Personal Condition," 66 Harv. L. Rev. 1203, 1209 (1953),
noting 37 jurisdictions where vagrancy is so defined. Compare those few poor relief statutes
which make public work assignments compulsory for recipients, as in Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 62,
§ 2522 (1941), or which make ineligible for relief the recipient who refuses to take a
public work assignment when it is offered, as in N.Y. Social Welfare Law § 164(4)
(Supp. 1958).
33 Recent statistics indicate an average monthly payment in general assistance of $64.27
per case. Weekly payments in unemployment compensation averaged $30.45 per case.
"Social Security in Review," Soc. Sec. Bull., Vol. 22, No. 1, p. 1 (January, 1959).
34 Under Taft-Hartley the work refusal requirement is judicially imposed. The lack of
available legislative histories prevents an analysis of statutory intent under state unem-
ployment compensation statutes, and the federal labor standards provision, which is some-
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reinstatement even though replaced. 3 But when the strike is called for
economic reasons the employer need not rehire the strikers if he has
secured permanent replacements,386 provided he does so without discrimi-
nation. Outside the context of labor-management conflict, the employee
may be entitled to reinstatement under the terms of section 8(a) (3),
which prohibits employers "by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure
of employment... to... discourage membership in any labor organiza-
tion. 7
When it will "effectuate the policies" of the act,38 the National Labor
Relations Board may order reinstatement with back pay. While the Su-
preme Court has said that back pay is awarded to carry out the public
purpose in securing labor peace rather than to give personal redress, 39
its handling of the back pay remedy belies this characterization. 0 Al-
though the reinstatement section does not carry a work refusal require-
ment, the Court read one into the law in Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB. 1
In an admixture of reason reminiscent of the common law cases, the
Court pointed out that only "actual" losses should be compensated, that
the employee is not entitled to back pay if he has "willfully incurred" a
loss by refusing another job, and concluded that the adoption of the
work refusal test will advance "the healthy policy of promoting produc-
tion and employment."'
Nothing was said in Phelps Dodge about the application to work re-
fusals of a requirement that the discharged employee be forced to lower
his sights. In its decisions on the necessity of seeking dissimilar work at
lower pay the Board has generally followed the prevailing common law
view,43 while the courts of appeals have followed the minority common
law position.4 Unfortunately, beyond a reference to general statutory
what protective of the union position, has no generally helpful congressional history. Note,
56 Yale LJ. 384, 392 (1947). But see note 155, infra.
35 NLRB v. MacKay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938).
36 Ibid.
37 49 Stat. 452 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (3) (1952).
38 49 Stat. 454 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1952).
39 United Automobile Workers v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634, 643 (1958) ; Phelps Dodge Corp.
v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 200 (1941).
40 For similar comments see 106 U. Pa. L. Rev. 135 (1957); Note, 50 Yale LJ. 507
(1941). See also NLRB v. Seven-Up Bottling Co., 344 U.S. 344, 346 (1953) (in making
back pay awards the Board "must have regard for considerations governing the mitigation
of damages"); NLRB v. Armstrong Tire & Rubber Co., 6 CCH Lab. L. Rep. Par.
65, 229 (5th Cir. 1959) (same).
41 313 U.S. 177 (1941).
42 Id. at 198, 200.
43 Southern Silk Mills, Inc., 116 N.L.R.B. 769 (1956), enforcement denied, 242 F.2d
697 (6th Cir. 1957); Brotherhood of Painters, Local No. 419, 114 N.L.R.B. 295 (1955).
Cf. Columbia Pictures Corp., 82 N.L.R.B. 568, 580 (1949).
44 NLRB v. Southern Silk Mills, 242 F.2d 697 (6th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 821
(1957); NLRB v. Moss Planing Mill Co., 224 F.2d 702 (4th Cir. 1955). The common
law cases which Moss Planing cites are among those adopting the minority position. See
46 Geo. L.J. 350 (1958); 43 Va. L. Rev. 951 (1957). In Southern Silk Mills, the trial
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purposes, none of the cases has articulated the reasons for its result. As
yet there is no Supreme Court interpretation. However, differences be-
tween the Board and the courts seem more a matter of emphasis. Just
like the prevailing common law view, the Board's holding that the em-
ployee need only take substantially equivalent employment permits some
elasticity, and the courts require that the job offered must be "suitable,"
in part in terms of the individual's training and background. Neither the
Board nor the courts have been sufficiently explicit in articulating the
standards of suitability to be applied. The only apparent settled point of
difference lies in the Board's continued insistence that the aggrieved em-
ployee not be compelled to take another job at less pay than his former
employment.
Work refusal requirements in Taft-Hartly must also be tested in terms
of their impact on other sections of the statute. The provisions of the
National Labor Relations Act reveal a statutory pattern protective of
union conduct. Apart from those cases in which the union transgresses a
specific unfair labor practice provision, such as the one prohibiting sec-
ondary boycotts,45 its conduct is protected whenever it falls within the
ambit of permitted concerted activities. The federal statute thus reflects
an environment favorable to union organizing, to good faith bargaining
and collective agreements, and to strikes for bargaining objectives.4 6
Should the work refusal requirement as administered in aid of the rein-
statement remedy conflict with these other statutory purposes, it may
alter this otherwise favorable statutory climate.
Conflicts of this type have arisen infrequently, and the cases have
usually deferred to the union position and to the policy of other provi-
sions in the act that are protective of union activities. One court of ap-
peals permitted the Board to consider the effect of the new job on the
employee's seniority status in his former position 7 Of particular interest
is NLRB v. Armour & Co.4 8 Here the employees were offered a choice
between transfer to a less desirable job or the abandonment of their union
activities. Because the job offer was itself discriminatory under section
8(a) (3), the court held that a rejection would not require a deduction
from back pay. The case raises the question whether a job offer imposing
conditions running contrary to other provisions of the statute would be
forced on the employee. Board cases, however, have indicated that the
examiner had required the employees to lower their sights, in part because of his decision
that compensation under the statute is not given as a matter of "right" but as an incidental
effect of the back pay order.
45 61 Stat. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (1952).
46 49 Stat. 449 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 141 (1952).
47 Corning Glass Works v. NLRB, 129 F.2d 967 (2d Cir. 1942).
48 154 F.2d 570 (10th Cir. 1946).
[Vol. 44
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discharged employee's participation in strike and picket line activity may
be such as to compel a finding that he "willfully" failed to seek other
work. 9
The relationship of the work refusal test in Taft-Hartley to union ob-
jectives has been seldom litigated and little developed. In the context in
which this appraisal has been made, customary evaluations lose force,
such as the phrasing of the work refusal problem in terms of an under-
lying antagonism between common law mitigation and the broader pur-
poses of the federal labor statute." Compared to court opinions under
Taft-Hartley requiring a lowering of sights, the majority common law
rule is a good deal more favorable to the employee. Additional insight
into the impact on union objectives of the work refusal requirement can
be furnished by an inquiry into the unemployment compensation laws,
under which cases involving this problem are common. A survey of un-
employment compensation should also assist in an evaluation of the role
of the work refusal test, both under the compensation statutes and the
Taft-Hartley Act.
This survey of work refusals in unemployment compensation will ten-
tatively proceed on the assumption that the policies of the National Labor
Relations Act are applicable. Employees who have worked in businesses
that are subject to the NLRA and who apply for unemployment benefits
arguably are entitled to the protection of the federal labor law. Apart
from the interstate commerce implications of an applicant's former posi-
tion, the state unemployment compensation legislation has been passed
under the equivalent of a federal enabling act. Statutory and admin-
istrative reconciliation with the purposes of the federal labor law would
be in order on this basis, and the partial recognition in the federal un-
employment compensation statute of labor's protected status lends sup-
port to this assertion.
In the discussion that follows, specific interpretive problems arising
under the work refusal provisions of the unemployment compensation act
will be tested in terms of these assumptions. Since the federal labor
statute evinces a general encouragement of union concerted activity
49 Ozark Hardwood Co., 119 N.L.R.B. 1130 (1957) (employees on picket line did not
look for work); Columbia Pictures Corp., 82 N.L.R.B. 568 (1949) (employee collecting
strike donations).
See Daykin, "Back Pay Under the National Labor Relations Act," 39 Iowa L. Rev.
104 (1953); Lahne, "The NLRB and 'Willful Idleness,'" 8 Lab. L.J. 665 (1957). Compare
with related unemployment compensation statutory provisions the NLRB view that the
employee must actively seek work, and that the employee is disqualified if he participates
in a voluntary strike. On the latter point see the Ozark case, supra.
50 Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177 (1941) (dissenting opinion); Farber,
"Reversion to Individualism: The Back-Pay Doctrines of the NLRB," 7 Ind. & Lab. Rel.
Rev. 262 (1954).
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apart from its specific provisions, work refusals will be evaluated in light
of their impact on collective bargaining as well as in terms of their effect
on the specific provisions of the act itself. Finally, a reconstruction of
the Taft-Hartley and unemployment compensation acts will be attempted
in terms that more adequately take into account the aims of the work
refusal test in light of federal statutory labor policy.
UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION
Statutory Background
The work refusal test in unemployment compensation measures the
claimant's present attachment to the labor market.,1 It is contained both
in available for work provisions that determine eligibility for aid and
in work refusal provisions that disqualify the recipient from the receipt
of benefits.52 Almost all state laws disqualify the applicant for refusing
to accept "suitable work" without "good cause."53 While most of the
statutes list the criteria to be considered in the determination of suit-
ability, these do not touch on the problems arising from union affilia-
tion. 4 The statutes also disqualify employees for participation in a labor
dispute,55 and conflicts between this and the labor standards provision
immediately come to mind.
However, in accordance with the directive of the federal statute, all
states contain a protective labor standards provision. It provides that
the claimant need not accept "new work" if it is 1) "vacant due directly
to a strike, lockout, or other labor dispute," or 2) if it carries wages
and conditions of employment "substantially less favorable" than those
51 Compare common statutory provisions that test the applicant's previous attachment
to the labor market. These disqualify the applicant if he was discharged for misconduct,
or if he quit work for other than good cause. Comparisons infra note 53, at 87-95. Signifi-
cant parallels might be found between the work refusal and voluntary leaving provisions.
For example, the status of the employee who quits because of lack of union representation,
or because the plant wages are below scale, parallels the case of the applicant who refuses
suitable work for similar reasons. See Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 43, § 802(b) (Supp. 1957). In
determining whether the employee left with good cause, "the department shall give con-
sideration to the same factors, insofar as they are applicable ... with respect to the determi-
nation of suitable work." And benefits under this section are not to be denied "where as a
condition of continuing in employment such employee .. .would be denied the right of
collective bargaining under generally prevailing conditions."
52 The discussion that follows deals with the standard work refusal provisions in the
unemployment compensation laws. A few states have non-standard provisions that
depart from the common model. These are discussed in Appendix A.
53 Bureau of Employment Security, U.S. Dep't of Labor, Comparison of State Unem-
ployment Insurance Laws as of January 1, 1958, 84 at 96-99 (1958). A few statutes, while
not using the "suitable work" language, contain substantially similar provisions.
54 Id. at 97: "The usual criteria are the degree of risk to a claimant's health, safety,
and morals; his physical fitness and prior training, experience, and earnings; the length
of his unemployment and his prospects for securing work in his customary occupation;
and the distance of the available work from his residence." The cases have not considered
these criteria as exclusive of other considerations, although most courts have required the
claimant to lower his sights as his unemployment lengthens and his prospects dim.
55 Id. at 99-101.
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"prevailing for similar work," or 3) if as a "condition" to employment
the applicant would have to join a "company union" or "resign from or
refrain from joining" a bona fide union.5 6
Work refusals are also tested under the eligibility provision contained
in all laws requiring the employee to be "available" for work,57 to which
the labor standards provision is also applicable. Furthermore, the stat-
utes either explicitly incorporate the "suitable work" test into the avail-
ability provision or it has been read in by administrative and judicial
interpretation.58 Accordingly, the applicant need only be available for
suitable work which he does not have good cause to refuse.
Questions immediately arise as to the relative function of the avail-
ability requirement as compared with the disqualification for refusing
suitable work. Suggestions that availability is a "rough", while the ex-
plicit work refusal disqualification is a "fine", screen for testing job
refusals59 are refuted by administrative practice.60 The comment has been
56 These provisions are required by Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 3304(a) (5), and are
reproduced in full in Appendix A. They apply both to the eligibility and the disqualification
sections. Compare the similar provision in the Federal Railroad Unemployment Insurance
Act. It contains additional sections more favorable to the union position:
"No work shall be deemed suitable . .. if-
(ii) . . . the rate of remuneration is less than the union wage rate, if any, for similar
work in the locality;
(iv) acceptance of the work would require him to engage in activities in violation of
law or which, by reason of their being in violation of reasonable requirements of
the constitution, by-laws, or similar regulations of a bona fide labor organization of
which he is a member, would subject him to expulsion from such labor organiza-
tion; or
(v) acceptance of the work would subject him to loss of substantial seniority rights
under any collective bargaining agreement between a railway labor organization,
organized in accordance with the provisions of the Railway Labor Act, and any
other employer." 52 Stat. 1099 (1938), as amended, 45 U.S.C. § 354(c) (1952).
57 Op. cit. supra note 53 at .84-86.
58 Fifteen states now provide that the employee need only be available for suitable work
or its equivalent. Supra note 53 at 84. For judicial interpretations to like effect see
Garcia v. California Stab. Comm'n, 71 Cal. App. 2d 107, 161 P.2d 972 (1945); Reger v.
Administrator, 132 Conn. 647, 46 A.2d 844 (1946); Raborn v. Heard, 87 So. 2d 146 (La.
App. 1956); Swanson v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 240 Minn. 449, 61 N.W.2d
526 (1953); Krauss v. A. & M. Karagheusian, Inc., 13 N.J. 447, 100 A.2d 277 (1953); In re
Miller, 243 N.C. 509, 91 S.E.2d 241 (1956), noted in, 34 N.C.L. Rev. 591 (1956); Unemploy-
ment Comp. Comm'n v. Dan River Mills Inc., 197 Va. 816, 91 S.E.2d 642 (1956). Sometimes
the court will add the "good cause" limitation by holding that the claimant must be
available for suitable work which he does not have good cause to refuse. A contrary
interpretation by the Ohio court, Brown-Brockmeyer v. Board of Review, 70 Ohio App. 370,
45 N.E.2d 152 (1942), has been changed by statute. Ohio Rev. Code § 4141.29 (Supp.
1957). The cases often rely on Freeman, "Able to Work and Available for Work," 55 Yale
L.J. 123 (1945) (citing administrative interpretations). To the same effect see Altman,
"Availability for Work" 90 (1950); U.S. Social Security Bd., Principles Underlying Avail-
ability for Work 11, 12 (Mimeo 1945).
59 This thesis is suggested by Altman, op. cit. supra note 58, at 84-87, 108. He points
out that a man who refuses a suitable job without good cause is commonly disqualified
for the job refusal, but may be found available if he is willing to accept other suitable work.
But even this administrative practice has little meaning when the disqualification for
suitable work is more severe.60 See Comment, 1952 U. Ill. L.F. 164.
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made,6 to which a review of the cases lends support, that administrators
dealing with a specific instance of work refusal tend to apply the dis-
qualification or to find the claimant unavailable depending on the severity
of the penalty which they choose to impose. Availability is tested each
week,62 and ineligibility on this basis may be temporary. The disquali-
fication for a work refusal is more permanent. Some states disqualify for
the remainder of the unemployment, some for several weeks, and some
cancel benefit rights earned by the employee.63
Like Taft-Hartley and the common law, unemployment insurance thus
pays benefits only to persons who reasonably refuse work. In the former,
however, the work refusal test appeared to be applied in terms of a
standard external to the individual involved. Unemployment insurance
permits some consideration of individual preference, inasmuch as the
applicant may refuse "suitable" work for "good cause." Difficulties have
arisen in attempts to find independent meanings for these two terms.
Judicial and agency interpretation, while not settled,. tends to limit
"good cause" to reasons personal to the employee and to apply the "suit-
ability" standard to the job itself.64 But the two parts of the work refusal
disqualification merely represent differing perspectives of the same
problem, and they tend to merge in the decisions.6 5 However, the intro-
duction of "good cause" considerations does permit an individualized ad-
ministration66 which, apart from the labor standards provision, can lead
61 Becker, "The Problem of Abuse in Unemployment Benefits" 53 (1953); Comment,
30 Texas L. Rev. 735 (1952).
62 Supra note 53 at 83.
63 Supra note 53 at 98, 99. For this reason, the Social Security Board preferred a
determination of unavailability. "Principles Underlying Availability for Work," supra
note 58, at 3.
64 For a good discussion see Swanson v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 240
Minn. 449, 61 N.W.2d 526 (1953). The Pennsylvania cases are in accord. E.g., Haug v.
Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 162 Pa. Super. 1, 56 A.2d 396 (1948). For a similar
agency practice see Letter from Max M. Horton, Director, Michigan Employment Security
Commission, to the writer, January 9, 1959. See also Menard, "Refusal of Suitable Work,"
55 Yale L.J. 134 (1945).
65 This corresponds to the position taken in U.S. Social Security Bd., Principles
Underlying the Suitable-Work Disqualification 7 (Mimeo 1945). Compare Tung-Sol
Electric Inc. v. Board of Review, 35 N.J. Super. 397, 114 A.2d 285 (1955).
66 Consider the impact of a personalized test on the problems involved in dealing fairly
with a high volume of claims. Disqualifications in unemployment compensation have been
running at a rate approximating one million a year, while new qualifying claims have been
averaging from five to nine million a year. In an average year about half of these
disqualifications were attributable to findings of unavailability and to disqualifications for
work refusals. "Trends in Disqualifications," 1935-1955, Employment Security Review, Vol.
22, No. 8, pp. 41, 45 (August, 1955). As the number of claims increase the experience is
that the number of disqualifications decrease. The article reports that the appeal provisions
in the statute have worked well. At that time over two million appeals had been taken,
and an average of 14 out of every 100 disqualified claimants was seeking appellate review.
Id. at 46.
The table shows the disqualifications attributable to unavailability and to the disqualifica-
tion for refusal to work.
1959] REFUSALS TO WORK AND UNION OBJECTIVES 489
to a consideration of objections based on a union orientation.67
From this brief review, the purpose of the work refusal requirement in
unemployment insurance emerges ambiguously. Perhaps the closest anal-
ogy is poor relief, since in both programs the work refusal test functions
as a prime determinant of eligibility, and in both programs the eligibility
test is framed, to some extent, in terms personal to the applicant. Dispute
has flared, however, between those who accept the analogy to the sub-
sistence program of poor relief, and those who reject it and who view
unemployment insurance as a status program which seeks to protect
Disqualifications Per 1000 Claimant Contacts
1945 1949 1954
Availability 8.3 5.4 6.7
Refusal of Suitable Work 2.4 .8 .9
All Others 5.2 5.8 9.5
Total 15.9 12.0 17.1
Adapted from Id., Table 7, at p. 46.
In 1954, out of 1,616,000 disqualifications, 633,000 were attributable to unavailability,
while 83,000 were attributable to a refusal to accept suitable work. Claimant contacts
represent initial claims filed, to which are added the total continued weeks of insured
unemployment.
67 For typical judicial statements indicating the subjective nature of the determination
see Mohler v. Department of Labor, 409 Ill. 79, 97 N.E.2d 762 (1951) (availability);
Pacific Mills v. Director of Div. of Emp. Security, 322 Mass. 345, 77 N.E.2d 413 (1948)
(administrator has discretion in determining suitable work; statutory criteria not exclusive) ;
Higgins v. Board of Review, 33 N.J. Super. 535, 111 A.2d 288 (1955) ("Individualization
is administratively inherent in the concepts of willingness, readiness, and availability for
work"). In recent years, a tendency toward amplifying and making more particular the
disqualification provisions has tended to narrow the area of administrative discretion.
"Trends in Disqualifications," supra note 66, at 41-43. However, this tendency has not
been evident in the provisions affecting union objectives.
Two additional examples of the individualization of the disqualification requirement are
of interest here. Most cases now recognize as valid a refusal to accept work on Saturday
for religious reasons. E.g., Swenson v. Employment Security Comm'n, 340 Mich. 430, 65
N.W.2d 709 (1954); Tary v. Board of Review, 161 Ohio St. 251, 119 N.E.2d 56 (1954).
Statutory inclusion of the "risk to morals" as a factor affecting suitability facilitates this
interpretation, and highlights the individualized approach of the statute. Are labor union
ideals moral in character?
Another problem that has caused difficulties involves the applicant who finds no job
requiring his skills in his labor market. Provided there are some openings for those with
the applicant's qualifications, some courts find him available. E.g., Reger v. Administrator,
132 Conn. 647, 46 A.2d 844 (1946). Other courts find him unavailable on the ground that
there is no availability of work, even though the applicant is available for work. Wiley
v. Carroll, 201 S.W.2d 320 (Mo. 1947). The former approach has been characterized as
subjective, inasmuch as it credits the employee's attitudes, so long as there is some market
for his skills. See Note, 17 Fordham L. Rev. 150 (1948). What happens when the employee
is willing and able to do work for which there is no market is another question. This
problem is discussed in the text, infra, in terms of the worker who restricts himself to non-
union jobs in an area that is heavily unionized. Compare Jackson v. Review Bd., 124 Ind.
App. 648, 120 N.E.2d 413 (1954).
68 A related argument centers on whether the program seeks to alleviate short-term or
long-term unemployment. Until federal aid was made available in 1958 to extend un-
employment compensation benefits, some observers had put the program in the short-term
category. See Brockway, "Federal Policies on Unemployment Insurance-What Are They
And What Should They Be?" in Proceedings of New York University Eleventh Annual
Conference on Labor 301 (1958); Riesenfeld, "The Place of Unemployment Insurance
Within the Patterns and Policies of Protection Against Wage-Loss," 8 Vand. L. Rev. 218
(1955). Compare Burns, "Unemployment Compensation and Socio-Economic Objectives,"
CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
the standard of living enjoyed by the applicant in his previous position."
While the benefit provisions of the statute have taken a middle ground,"0
a consensus has not yet been reached on this issue.
Since unemployment compensation has been categorized as a social
insurance that confers a "right", in contrast to poor relief, which is
handed out as a matter of "privilege", 71 a better analogy might be made
to the common law, which similarly applies the work refusal requirement
to contracts of employment conferring "rights." But the common law
analogy has been rejected when it has been considered.72 Accordingly, the
answer has to be found in explicit statutory unemployment compensation
policy.
An important ingredient of that policy is the statutory language de-
fining the type of unemployment entitled to compensation. In the early
model bill prepared for state adoption by the federal agency the declara-
tion of policy limited the purposes of the law to the compensation of "in-
voluntary" unemployment for the benefit of persons unemployed through
no "fault" of their own.73 While a later model bill omitted these pro-
visions, and while some state statutes have dropped them,74 courts and
55 Yale L.J. 1 (1945). Conceivably, a program geared to long-term unemployment would
insist on a stricter work refusal policy, on the theory that the support of the voluntarily
idle on a long-term basis would be too costly. For a discussion of the development of
unemployment compensation see Witte, "An Historical Account of Unemployment Insurance
in the Social Security Act," 3 Law & Contemp. Prob. 157 (1936).
69 This cleavage in opinion was much in evidence during the debates on the future of
unemployment compensation that took place during the immediate post-war period. See
Becker, op. cit. supra note 61, at 12-37, 54-61. In part, the more conservative, or subsistence,
school was worried about the possible adverse effects on production levels of a liberal
benefit policy.
70 Benefits are intended to equal 507 of the wage received prior to unemployment. How-
ever, because of recent inflationary trends the statutory objective has not been realized, and
statutory maxima tend to depress the benefit amount even further. Burns, Social Security
and Public Policy 52 (1956). Considering the impact of income taxes and working
expenses on gross earnings, the benefit may still be roughly equivalent to the net wages
offered in new employment paying substantially less than the previous job. While this
is a factor that would tend to encourage idleness, other provisions in the program have
the opposite effect. Benefits are ordinarily payable only for six months. Supra note 53,
at 75, 76. Furthermore, the exhaustion rate in unemployment compensation has been
surprisingly high, even in good times. In 1953, a relatively good year, the exhaustion rate
was over 25% in more than half of the states. Riesenfeld, supra note 68, at 240.
71 For a classic statement see tenBroek & Wilson, "Public Assistance and Social Insurance
-A Normative Evaluation," 1 U.C.L.A.L. Rev. 237 (1954). See also Mandelker, "A Legal
Perspective on General Assistance," 31 Soc. Serv. Rev. 418 (1957). The generally unsettled
status of the privilege doctrine in constitutional law is explored in Note, 40 Minn. L. Rev.
486 (1956).
72 The few statements that have been found indicate that common law principles do not
control the interpretation of the unemployment compensation act. E.g., Copper Range
Co. v. Michigan Unemployment Compensation Comm'n, 320 Mich. 460, 31 N.W.2d 692
(1948) (labor dispute disqualification).
73 This history is discussed in Harrison, "Forenote: Statutory Purpose and 'Involuntary
Unemployment,'" 55 Yale L.J. 117 (1945).
74 La. Rev. Stat. § 23:1471 (Supp. 1956); Me. Rev. Stat. c. 29, § 1 (Supp. 1957);
R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-42-2 (1956); Utah Code Ann. § 35-4-2 (1953); W. Va. Code Ann.
§ 2366(1) (1955) ; Wis. Stat. Ann. § 108.01 (1957). Eleven states have no statutory decla-
ration of policy. Most of the remaining statutes have policy sections carrying the voluntary-
[Vol. 4
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administrators often frame their interpretations of work refusal require-
ments in terms of the "voluntary-fault" standard in the declaration of
policy. 75 From this perspective, claimant, rejections of job offers im-
posing conditions thought inimical to union objectives can be attributed
to the "voluntary" act of an employee who is at "fault.176
Finally, mention should be made of a common judicial and admin-
istrative declaration that, insofar as a work refusal involves union con-
fault language. Arkansas amended its statute in 1949 to include this language. Ark. Stat.
Ann. § 81-1101 (Supp. 1957). An occasional statute will omit either the reference to fault,
Ill. Ann. Stat. c. 48, § 300 (Supp. 1958), or to the involuntary nature of the unemployment,
Ind. Ann. Stat. § 52-1525 (Burns 1951). References to the voluntary-fault language are
common in the cases, but whether the omission of either or both of these characterizations
will have an influence on the decisions is problematical.
75 For cases interpreting work refusal provisions in these terms see, e.g., Welch v. Review
Bd., 115 Ind. App. 230, 58 N.E.2d 363 (1944) ; Robinson v. Maryland Employment Security
Bd., 202 Md. 515, 97 A.2d/300 (1953); W. T. Grant Co. v. Board of Review, 129 N.J.L.
402, 29 A.2d 858 (1943). See also Riesenfeld, supra note 68; Sanders, "Disqualifica-
tion for Unemployment Insurance," 8 Vand. L. Rev. 307 (1955). Conversely, unemploy-
ment compensation becomes an employer fault law, especially in view of provisions which
limit the disqualifying effect of a voluntary quit by the employee to cases where the good
cause was attributable to the employer. See Anson v. Fisher Amusement Corp., 93 N.W.2d
815 (Minn. 1958); Clague & Reticker, "Trends in Disqualification From Benefits Under
State Unemployment Compensation Laws," Soc. Sec. Bull., Vol. 7, No. 1, pp. 12, 22
(January, 1944).
76 The emphasis on employee fault in decisions on work refusals is accentuated by ex-
perience rating provisions, which are now found in all states except Alaska. Supra note 53,
at 21. Except in three states, which levy a nominal employee tax, the unemployment com-
pensation program is financed entirely by employer contributions. Id. at 18. Under
experience rating the amount of the employer tax varies directly with the unemployment
benefits attributable to his business, so that a good employment record will result in a low
tax. Supra note 53, at 32-36. Ten states charge benefits to the most recent employer.
Twenty-three charge proportionately all of the employers for whom the employee worked
during the base period for which the benefits are calculated. Ten states charge the base
period employers in inverse chronological order, with maximum limits on the amount that
can be charged to any one employer. Especially under the latter type of provision, offers
to work by previous employers figure in a determination of the applicant's disqualification.
This may create complications in administration, and may give previous employers an
unfair opportunity to disqualify applicants. For example, an employee who left a previous
employer may not be disqualified under the act if he left for good cause. Supra note 53, at
89. When he subsequently becomes unemployed, the previous employer, if he is to be
charged for the benefits to be paid, may offer the employee his old job. At this point
the employee risks the possibility of disqualification for refusing suitable work. While
he can refuse suitable work for good cause, differences in interpretation under the two
sections may result in disqualification for the refusal but not for the voluntary leaving.
See Bureau of Employment Security, U.S. Dep't of Labor, Unemployment Insurance
Legislative Policy: Benefits, Eligibility 63 (Mimeo 1953).
For a case adopting the "fault" approach to a work refusal on the ground that the state
statute contained an experience rating provision, see Mills v. South Carolina Unemployment
Compensation Comm'n, 204 S.C. 37, 28 S.E.2d 535 (1944) (interpreting availability
requirement). An indication of this thinking can be found in the statement of policy in
the Wisconsin Act:
Each employing unit in Wisconsin should pay at least a part of this social cost
[unemployment], connected with its own irregular operations, by financing compensa-
tion for its own unemployed workers. . . .Whether or not a given employing unit
can provide steadier work and wages for its own employees, it can reasonably be
required to build up a limited reserve for unemployment.
Wis. Stat. Ann. § 1O8.O1(1) (1957).
But cf., Ault v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 188 Pa. Super. 260, 146
A.2d 729 (1958).
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siderations, the unemployment insurance program must remain neutral."1
This attitude stems from statutory provisions disqualifying claimants en-
gaged in a labor dispute, but the labor standards provisions discussed
above raise a conflicting intent. More accurately, the relationship of
unemployment compensation to union aims and objectives remains un-
resolved. This relationship will be examined in the discussion that fol-
lows. Attention will first center on work refusal problems arising out of
a labor-management dispute, and work refusal determinations that con-
flict with federal labor policy. The discussion will then be directed to the
negative impact of the unemployment insurance law on the objectives
and achievements of the labor union movement, and finally to the pos-
itive impact of the law on claimants who are uncommitted or antagonistic.
Labor-Management Disputes
-Claimants for unemployment compensation may refuse "new work"
that is vacant because of a labor dispute, but if they are unemployed be-
cause of a labor dispute at their place of employment they are disquali-
fied for its duration."8 As compared with similar provisions in the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act, these sections of the unemployment insurance
law impose a relatively gross test. Under neither provision are the merits
of the dispute considered. 9 An employee may refuse new work vacant
77 See Williams, "The Labor Dispute Disqualification-A Primer and Some Problems,"
8 Vand. L. Rev. 338, 356, 357 (1955).
78 Supra note 53, at 99-101. The most recent comprehensive review of the labor dispute
disqualification will be found in Williams, supra note 77, which discusses many of the
problems raised in this section from the perspective of the labor dispute disqualification
rather than the refusal to work requirement. See also Jones, "The Conflict Between
Collective Bargaining and Unemployment Insurance," 28 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 185 (1956).
Most state provisions incorporating the labor dispute disqualification follow the draft
bill, which provides for disqualification for any week in which the unemployment "is due
to a stoppage of work which exists because of a labor dispute at the factory, establishment
or other premises" at which the applicant was last employed. Williams, supra note 77,
at 339.
79 An example is furnished by the recurring problem of the employee who refuses to
cross the picket line that another union has set up at his plant. The NLRB has held that
section 8(a) (3) is not violated if the employee is discharged for this reason. Snow Auto
Parts Co., 107 N.L.R.B. 242 (1953), noted, 21 U. Chi. L. Rev. 765 (1954). The employee
would also be disqualified from unemployment compensation for having participated in
the labor dispute. E.g., Beaman v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 78 Ariz. 195, 277 P.2d 1010 (1954)
(applying voluntary quit disqualification); Matson Terminals, Inc. v. California Employ-
ment Comm'n, 24 Cal. 2d 695, 151 P.2d 202 (1944) (applying labor dispute disqualifica-
tion) ; McGann v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 163 Pa. Super. 379, 62 A.2d
87 (1948); AA 160.25-41 (N.J. B 1957) (employee refused suitable work). See Shadur,
"Unemployment Benefits and the 'Labor Dispute' Disqualification," 17 U. Chi. L. Rev. 294,
325-27 (1950). But cf., 3:4541-Ind. A. (For construction of citation form used, see Appendix
B, p. -. ) The applicant refused to cross a picket line set up by employees striking the
general contractor on a construction job. He worked for a subcontractor, and was upheld
in his refusal because crossing the picket line would have hurt his status in his own union.
On this basis the work was found unsuitable.
However, refusals to cross picket lines or to take job offers are upheld when the
applicant would be subject to picket line or other union violence if he did so. E.g., McGann
v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, supra; 9:11624-Hawaii R; 5:7041-Ohio A;
5:7555-Ohio A. Because of the physical danger to the applicant such decisions are inevitable,
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because of a dispute, even though the union on strike may be violating
an unfair labor practice provision of the federal act, but he will be dis-
qualified if his union strikes, though it be protected activity under the
federal law. Because these two provisions of the unemployment com-
pensation laws impose differing policies, cases will arise in which leg-
itimate doubt exists as to which is applicable. In these instances, con-
sideration of the underlying purposes of the law is noticeably lacking."0
Instead, the decision to apply one provision or the other has a construc-
tional basis, so that the employee's work refusal is automatically accepted
or rejected depending on the attitude taken toward the technicalities of
the statutory language.
Part of the explanation lies in the closely confined nature of the labor
dispute section. One example is presented by the employee who was dis-
charged prior to the time the labor dispute began.81 He is not disqualified
as the labor dispute has not caused the unemployment. Similarly, the
dynamics of the strike frequently create instances in which the labor dis-
pute disqualification no longer applies. A common example is the strike
that is broken. Either the employer manages to resume production with
replacements, or he discharges the strikers during the conduct of the
strike. While court and administrative 2 decision is divided, in most states
either the resumption of production" or the discharge 4 will terminate
the dispute and make the labor dispute disqualification inapplicable for
this reason.85
but have the anomalous result of strengthening the hand of the striking union that chooses
to resort to unlawful acts. Union violence in this context is an unfair labor practice under
the National Labor Relations Act. 20 NLRB Ann. Rep. 101-03 (1955).
80 Consider the difficult problem presented by the office employee who is asked to take
a position left vacant by the strikers. Since he is not identified with the strike the labor
disputes section does not disqualify. But the labor standards provision does not apply
because technically the work is not "new" in terms of the employment relationship with
the employer. A few cases uphold the job refusal on the ground that to do otherwise
would violate the intent of the labor standards provision. 10:11625-Hawaii R; 11:12900-
Mass. R. (dictum); 4:5229-N.J. D.
81 See the discussion in the text at note 92, infra.
82 Because appellate court appeals in unemployment compensation are relatively rare,
considering the volume of disqualifications, resort has been had to state administrative
decisions. The only generally available source for administrative decisions by state un-
employment compensation review boards and referees is the Benefit Series of the Bureau
of Employment Security of the Federal Department of Labor. The Series reports selected
administrative decisions on a monthly basis. It is more fully described in Appendix B,
where the citation form adopted for cases in the Series is also given.
83 On this point the leading case is Lawrence Baking Co. v. Michigan Unemployment
Compensation Comm'n, 308 Mich. 198, 13 N.W.2d 260 (1944). Accord, Sakrison v. Pierce,
66 Ariz. 162, 185 P.2d 528 (1947).
84 For cases finding the labor dispute disqualification inapplicable on this ground see
Milne Chair Co. v. Hake, 190 Tenn. 395, 230 S.W.2d 393 (1950); 11:12565-Conn. R;
12:13598-Mass. R. Compare Thomas v. California Employment Stabilization Comm'n,
39 Cal. 2d 501, 247 P.2d 561 (1952); Employment Security Comm'n of North Carolina
v. Jarrell, 231 N.C. 381, 57 S.E.2d 403 (1950).
85 But the employees may decide not to strike. Cf. Copper Range Co. v. Michigan
Unemployment Compensation Comm'n, 320 Mich. 460, 31 N.W.2d 692 (1948) (no dis-
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Some precedence is given to the labor disputes section, since occasional
claims that the labor standards provision has made the labor disputes
disqualification inoperable have been rejected whenever no question exists
about the disqualification of the employee because of the dispute.86 The
phrase in the labor standards section allowing the employee to reject
"new work" vacant because of a labor dispute is not applied to the last
employment, and the decisions are probably correct since to hold other-
wise would nullify the labor disputes disqualification altogether. Ac-
cordingly, an explicit offer of work by the employer during the course of
the strike cannot be rejected as unsuitable under the labor standards
clause.8 7
But when the labor disputes section is no longer applicable for the rea-
sons cited above, the decisions tend to reach a contrary conclusion. Con-
sequently, in spite of professions of neutrality, the law takes sides. If
the strike has failed and the employer has reopened, the cases allow the
employee to reject an offer to return to work yet still collect compensa-
tion.8 In informal opinions, however, a contrary result was indicated by
the majority of the state agencies responding to a questionnaire" that
presented this fact situation as one of a series of hypotheses."' A dis-
qualification; company closed after employees refused wage reduction); 1:373-N.H. A.
(similar).
There are a few statutory limitations on the labor dispute disqualification. In West
Virginia the disqualification is not applicable if the strike is called over wages that are
less than prevailing. Homer Laughlin China Co. v. Hix, 128 W. Va. 613, 37 S.E.2d 649
(1946). Nine states exclude a stoppage of work due to a lockout. Supra note 53, at 100.
But cf. Erie Forge & Steel Corp. v. Unemployment Compensation Ed. of Review, 188 Pa.
Super. 405, 146 A.2d 751 (1958). However, when the labor dispute disqualification is in-
applicable, the employees may be disqualified for having voluntarily quit work without
good cause. International Furniture Co. v. Unemployment Compensation Ed. of Review,
185 Pa. Super. 235, 138 A..2d 207 (1958).
86 Barber v. California Employment Stabilization Comm'n, 130 Cal. App. 2d 7, 278
P.2d 762 (1954); Bilodeau v. Maine Employment Security Comm'n, 153 Me. 254, 136
A.2d 522 (1957). But cf., Buckeye Coal Co. v. Unemployment Compensation Ed. of Review,
161 Pa. Super. 594, 56 A.2d 393 (1948) (labor dispute disqualification applied but work at
struck plant also held unsuitable). Compare Beaman v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 78 Ariz.
195, 277 P.2d 1010 (1954) (must pick disqualification section most applicable).
87 American Tool Works v. McDermott, LD 205.2-33 (Ohio C.P. 1956). For a contrary
position see U.S. Social Security Ed., "Principles Underlying the Suitable-Work Disqualifica-
tion" 17 (Mimeo 1945). An employer's job offer during a strike may or may not be
privileged under the National Labor Relations Act, depending on whether it is calculated
to undermine the union's position. Olin Mathieson Chemical Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 232 F.2d
158 (4th Cir. 1956), aff'd, 352 U.S. 1020 (1957).
88 Sakrison v. Pierce, 66 Ariz. 162, 185 P.2d 528 (1947) (labor standards section applied
to avoid finding of unavilability); SW 315-11 (Hawaii B 1953); SW 490-3 (Tenn. B 1951)
(work not new but is found unsuitable). The Hawaii decision held that to force the
strikers to take the work offered them after the strike was broken would violate the
statute's policy of neutrality toward labor disputes. Compare 9:10301-Tenn. R. See also
"Principles Underlying the Suitable-Work Disqualification," supra note 87.
89 To supplement court opinions and administrative decisions, a questionnaire posing
several hypothetical questions involving union problems under the unemployment compensa-
tion acts was sent to half of the state agencies. A response was requested in terms of the
applicable policy. The survey and its results are described in Appendix C.
9o See Case #4 in the letter to unemployment compensation agencies, Appendix C.
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qualification was imposed on the ground that the labor dispute was still
in progress or that the work offered was suitable. Only a few agencies
would find the job unsuitable either on general grounds or on an applica-
tion of the labor standards provisionY As noted earlier, the employee's
relationship with the dispute may also be severed on an individual basis.
He may be discharged prior to the commencement of the strike,92 or
during its progress,93 or he may find new employment during the strike
and then be laid off involuntarily from the new job.94 In these situations,
the cases permit him to reject a job offered by the employer at the struck
plant.
Those decisions dealing with severance on an individual basis appear
correct vis-a-vis the compensation law, since the employee is no longer
identified with the dispute, or never was, and the severance can be said
to come about through no fault of his own. To compensate strikers when
the strike has failed involves the law in the dispute, however, since the
expectation of receiving unemployment benefits may encourage them to
continue. But since the unemployment compensation acts are not se-
lective in terms of the merits of the strike,95 to pay benefits in either of
the cases indicated does not always match well with the policy of the
federal labor law. For example, an employee who strikes for economic
reasons and who is permanently replaced under circumstances free of
discrimination for union reasons is not entitled to reinstatement under
Taft-Hartley but may be entitled to unemployment compensation. In
this case the statutes protect the employee through the reinstatement
remedy so long as he remains attached to his job, and then consistently
substitute unemployment benefits when he has been replaced. However,
employees who strike over an employer unfair labor practice and who are
then replaced are entitled both to unemployment compensation and to
reinstatement with back pay. Since the unemployment compensation
paid may not be offset against the back pay award,96 a double recovery
may result.
91 Iowa, Michigan (perhaps), New Jersey (if condition of employment clause violated),
and Utah. job suitable: Alabama, California, Pennsylvania. Labor dispute disqualification
applicable: Connecticut, Florida, New York, Ohio. South Dakota and perhaps Michigan
would not apply the labor standards section but would approach the problem under the
individualized statutory criteria relating to job suitability. The variance between administra-
tive practice and the few available administrative and court decisions is of interest. Little
explanatory comment was offered by the respondents replying to the questionnaire.
92 Davis v. Hix, 140 W. Va. 398, 84 S.E.2d 404 (1954), noted, 57 W. Va. L. Rev. 231
(195) ; SW 315-5 (Cal. B 1950); 11:12418-Conn. R; 12:13288-Kan. R; 11:12854-Okla. A.
See also LD 175-55 (Tex. A 1958) (employee ill and off work for one month prior to strike).
93 3:3445-Del. A; 4:5285-Ind. A.
94 Bergen Pt. Iron Works v. Board of Review, 137 NJ.L. 685, 61 A.2d 267 (Ct. Err.
& App. 1948); 11:12859-Ohio R.
95 Comment, 49 Mich. L. Rev. 886 (1951).
9 Unemployment benefits are not deductible from the back pay award. N.L.R.B. v.
Gullett Gin Co., 340 U.S. 361 (1951).
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Cases involving work refusals in connection with strike activity not
found to be disqualifying are also tested under the "availability" pro-
vision. In these cases the decision has turned on the striker's involve-
ment with the union. If the striker is free to seek other work in spite of
the strike he is found available,97 but if his involvement in union activity
effectively prevents him from seeking work elsewhere he is held to be
unavailable . 5 While not directly applicable to this type of case, the labor
standards provision conceivably manifests a statutory intent protective
of strikes whenever the labor disputes disqualification does not apply.
However, the labor standards clause has not been considered, and the
cases echo the notion of a "voluntary" limitation on employment which
obviously derives from the statutory declaration of policy. Practically,
however, the striker may have to abandon the strike to collect compensa-
tion,9 which, although consistent with the labor dispute disqualification,
is inconsistent with the intent behind the labor standards provision. The
cases call for a decision on the merits, and do not seem aware that the
results reached pull the unemployment compensation act against, rather
than for, the strikers.
An extreme interpretation of "availability" in the strike context, which
emphasizes this point and which runs contrary to the purpose behind the
federal labor law, was adopted in a Kentucky administrative decision. 00
In this case the employee actively and sincerely looked for work, in spite
of picket line obligations. However, the employers to whom she applied
97 Milne Chair Co. v. Hake, 190 Tenn. 395, 230 S.W.2d 393 (1950); 3:3114-Idaho A;
4:6634-Ind. R (no offers of employment had been refused and no obligation to appear on
picket line); 12:13768-Mass. A (though receiving strike benefits applicants had looked for
other work); 3:2897-N.D. A; AA 475.05-13 (W. Va. A 1958). Cf., AA 475-05-1 (R.I.
B (1950) (crewman out of work because of dispute between canneries and boat owners).
98 Cases predicated on applicant's decision to become personally involved: Clinton v.
Hake, 185 Tenn. 476, 206 S.W.2d 889 (1947) (affirming board of review on the facts);
11:12651-Conn. R (based also on finding of picket line violence); 12:13598-Mass. R
(apparently based on receipt of strike benefits); 10:12051-N.J. R (applicant elected presi-
dent of union). Cases predicated on union's action: 12:13079-N.J. R (union struck all
places of employment and prohibited members from working at struck plants); 12:13240-
N.Y. R (applicant prohibited from taking job during strike on pain of losing union
membership). But cf., 1:502-Wis. A.
For a similar holding on availability in an analogous situation see the cases involving the
miners' union tactic of working only a three-day week if the old contract expires before
a new one can be negotiated. Bedwell v. Review Bd., 119 Ind. App. 607, 88 N.E.2d 916
(1949); Unemployment Compensation Comm'n v. Tomko, 192 Va. 463, 65 S.E.2d 524
(1951), noted, 9 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 109 (1952).
99 See Producers Produce Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 365 Mo. 996, 291 S.W.2d 166 (1956).
The strikers were held unavailable because of a finding that their positions were still
vacant and that they intended to maintain the employer-employee relationship and resume
their old jobs when the strike was over. Cf., Adams v. American Lava Corp., 188 Tenn.
69, 216 S.W.2d 728 (1948).
100 AA 475.05-15 (Ky. B 1958). Compare SW 475.8-3 (Del. B 1956). Here the applicant
was a union member, and an employer refused to accept her because he did not want
union girls in his factory. No disqualification was found; while the applicant might have
resigned the union and obtained the job, this would be contrary to the labor standards
provision.
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refused to take her because of her prior identification with a strike
against a former employer. For this reason, the applicant was found to
be unavailable. That the right to strike and picket is constitutionally and
legally guaranteed could not affect a determination of eligibility under
the unemployment insurance law.
A similar case was posed in the questionnaire distributed to the state
agencies, and the replies received voiced an almost unanimous contrary
opinion.'"' The position of the Kentucky board would permit employers
to deprive employees of compensation simply by refusing them employ-
ment on the basis of their union activities. Yet a refusal to hire based on
reasons connected with union affiliation is an unfair labor practice under
section 8(a) (3) of the federal labor law. Consequently, under the Ken-
tucky interpretation, the unemployment insurance act can be used to
sanction employer conduct that would be violative of the federal labor
law. That the employee might successfuly bring an unfair labor practice
charge against the employer who refuses to hire him does not alter the
consequences of the case for the administration of unemployment com-
pensation.
This discussion of the treatment under unemployment insurance of
employees involved in strike activity, but not covered by the labor dis-
putes disqualification, has pointed up inconsistencies in the opinions.
Most of the cases project the compensation law into the dispute, but pull
variously for or against the strikers. How these cases should be resolved
is an open question. If the labor disputes section is inapplicable perhaps
the inclusion of a labor standards provision points toward a recognition
of the employee's right to strike. A theoretically neutral decision is dif-
ficult to construct, since a decision for or against the striker will have an
effect for or against the strike. Under the present statutory structure in
unemployment compensation, however, the cases can be reconciled. When
the employer resumes production after having replaced or discharged
the employee, the unemployment can no longer be considered as volun-
tarily incurred. But the presence of the employee on the picket line may
be said to have imposed a voluntary limitation on availability. More ex-
plicit consideration of the impact of these decisions on labor policy would
require the introduction of new statutory concepts.
101 See Case #5 in the letter to unemployment compensation agencies, Appendix C.
Of the agencies replying to this hypothetical, only Connecticut would find the applicant
unavailable. Nine would find him available: Alabama, California, Florida, Iowa, Michigan,
New Jersey, New York, Ohio, and Utah. The California agency reasoned that since to
strike is a "right" guaranteed by law, the unemployment of the individual under the
circumstances indicated is not his "fault."
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Conflicts with Federal Labor Policy Outside the Strike Context
Disqualification policies in unemployment compensation laws also lose
sight of the fact that union-management relations are not always carried
on in the blacks and whites of a strike. In the case of contract reopen-
ings, the dynamics of the bargaining process are such that the strike is
often only the last resort, and prolonged negotiations may precede the
union's decision to call out its members. As relationships reach the break-
ing point, other union members may be reluctant to take a position in a
plant where "trouble" can be anticipated. But in the few cases that have
considered a refusal to work for this reason the claimants have been
denied compensation. 2 The labor standards provision has not been ap-
plied because no labor dispute is in actual progress.
The effect these decisions will have on the relative bargaining powers
of the union and the employer is difficult to ascertain, and will depend on
plant turnover, the state of the labor market, and the strength of the bar-
gaining union. But this approach tends to conscript a labor force for
the employer, inasmuch as compensation claimants who turn down a job
offer do so on pain for forfeiting their benefits. While the effect on the
union of new accretions to the plant force depends on immeasurable im-
ponderables, the employer has an opportunity to weaken the union.
Knowing that a strike is in the offing, he might chance the discharge of
the active union leaders, with the knowledge that unemployed workers
to whom he offers the vacancies may find themselves compelled to accept
them.
In the latter situation, union-oriented compensation claimants who are
referred to these jobs might reject -them because they were vacated as the
consequence of an alleged employer unfair labor practice. The employer
may also have a prior record of anti-union animus, marked by discrim-
inatory discharges, coercive tactics, and similar conduct. Although no
cases have arisen in which a job rejection for this reason was con-
sidered,103 one of the cases in the questionnaire sent to the state agencies
posed this problem in terms of prior conduct of the type descibed. Most
of the responses would not accept the job refusal, although there was
some indication of a contrary decision'in the case of a pending viola-
tion.114 They represent a failure to consider the union-oriented objections
102 Bigger v. Unemployment Compensation Comm'n, 43 Del. 553, 53 A.2d 761 (1947);
SW 475.05-3 (Cal. B 1953); 10:11368-Conn. R. Cf. Sweeney v. Unemployment Compensa-
tion Bd. of Review, 177 Pa. Super. 243, 110 A.2d 843 (1955).
103 But cf., SW 475.55-13 (Ore. A 1954). There was "trouble" between the union and
the employer who offered the job, and the claimant would have lost his union status had
he taken it. The work refusal was accepted.
104 The responses were given to case #2 in the letter to state agencies. The following
states indicated either that the work was suitable or that the applicant did not have
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which fall outside the specific protection of the labor standards provision,
which protects the union from the potential strikebreaker only if it
chooses to strike.1 5 But since striking employees are disqualified under
the compensation statute, this course of action may also give the union
pause.
Another category of cases giving rise to potential conflicts in policy is
typified by the union leaders discharged during contract negotiations.
Here, as in other cases involving a discharge that discriminates against
union members, the employees may file an 8(a) (3) complaint with the
NLRB asking for reinstatement and back pay. If the complaining em-
ployee willfully refuses other work he may not fully recover his back pay
should he succeed, although he will still be entitled to reinstatement. With
this in mind, it is open to question whether it is consistent or inconsistent
with the policies of the National Labor Relations Act to excuse this em-
ployee from the work refusal disqualification in unemployment compensa-
tion. Since the labor law requires him to seek other work, perhaps the
unemployment compensation law should do likewise. On the other hand,
an ultimate finding in the employee's favor would characterize the dis-
missal as involuntary on his part, and the greater financial resources
good cause to refuse it: California (board to be neutral in labor matters) ; Florida; Michi-
gan; New Jersey; New York; Ohio; Pennsylvania. Replies from the following states
indicated that the applicant might be able to reject the offered work: Connecticut (if
present violation by employer); Iowa (if employee could make out strong case); South
Dakota (past unfair labor practices might give good cause to refuse); Utah (possibly if
present violation by employer).
There is some support for the minority position in an occasional opinion. See SW
475.75-5 (N.Y. 1952), holding that the applicant has good cause to refuse a job subject
to a union security clause invalid under the Taft-Hartley Act because it required immediate
union membership without the statutory 30-day grace period. Hiring under such a clause
constitutes an unfair labor practice under 8(a) (3). Cf., Baker v. Powhatan Mining Co.,
8:10040-Ohio Ct. D. (Ct. App.), rev'd, 146 Ohio St. 600, 67 N.E.2d 714 (1946). The con-
curring opinion in the court of appeals decision found that the employer's offer of work
involved an unfair labor practice under the federal statute because it constituted an
unlawful refusal to bargain collectively with the union. Accordingly, the work refusal was
justified, as a contrary holding would undermine judicial policy sustaining the right of
workers to organize and bargain collectively.
105 Compare Ludwigsen v. New Jersey Dep't of Labor, 12 N.J. 64, 95 A.2d 707 (1953).
Employees in the company cafeteria were covered by the union's contract. When the
employer turned the cafeteria over to an independent contractor, cafeteria employees
refused to go to work for him because they would lose their rights under the contract and
because he was claimed to be unsympathetic to unions. After a union-instigated boycott
of the new cafeteria management by the production employees, the employer agreed to
transfer the cafeteria employees to production jobs in the plant.
The cafeteria employees were found unavailable for work during the period of the
work refusal, the court noting that the new cafeteria management offered the employees
work at the old wages and on the same conditions. Acknowledging that the reason for
the collective refusal to work was understandable, the court nevertheless held that it
could not be considered in a determination of suitability or good cause under the statute.
Unions have usually objected to the conversion of plant departments to an independent
contractor status because it enables the principal employer to escape his obligations under
applicable legislation. An employer who does so may be found guilty of an unfair labor
practice under the federal labor relations act. NLRB v. Houston Chronicle Pub. Co., 211
F.2d 848 (5th Cir. 1954).
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available to the employer would support the giving of compensation to
the employee to sustain him while he is prosecuting the NLRB charge,
should he elect this course of action. Although the unemployment com-
pensation paid cannot reduce the back pay award, the employee would
probably have turned down suitable employment during the litigation
period. This refusal could be characterized as a willful refusal of work
sufficient to bring about a reduction of the back pay award, which prac-
ticably avoids a double recovery. In balance, however, the imponder-
ables in this situation also make for a difficult decision.
Almost unanimously, the few suggestive administrative decisions that
have touched on this problem,"0 6 and the agency responses to the posing
of this case on the questionnaire,'1 7 do not allow the applicant for benefits
to refuse a new job on the grounds of a pending 8(a) (3) charge. They
proceed on the claimed neutrality of the unemployment insurance act in
union matters, and on the irrelevance to the statute of the policies of the
federal labor law.
Contrary decisions in the cases discussed in this section may aid the
union position, although the effects of a decision either way may be
problematical. At least these cases indicate that when the merits of the
controversy are projected into a decision on the compensation claim the
unemployment insurance statute cannot remain neutral. Whether the
compensation act can be designed to evaluate the controversy without at
106 Unfortunately, both cases occurred during the War Labor Board (WLB) period of
World War II. In one case the employees refused other work on the ground that to do so
would jeopardize their reinstatement rights. The referee found against them on the ground
that the WLB might rule in their favor and that in all probability they would ultimately
receive back wages because of the WLB decision. 8:9535-Pa. A.
Compare 7:8960-Ill. A. In this case the employees had been discharged following a strike.
They claimed that to force them to take other work would break up the union. Because
of this limitation they were found unavailable, the referee holding that considerations of
union solidarity could not override the war effort. Here the WLB had certified the em-
ployees as available for other work, both in the interest of the war effort and because in
its opinion the settlement of the dispute before the WLB would not be jeopardized if the
employees involved took other jobs. The referee relied on this certification and also remarked
that the employees had limited their availability to their previous employer, but that
reemployment with him was problematic and could occur only at the instance of the WLB.
107 See Case #1 in the letter to state unemployment agencies, Appendix C. As the case
was stated, the agencies were asked whether the applicant could refuse any job offer because
of the pending 8(a) (3) charge. With one exception, the answer was in the negative,
either on the ground that the applicant had made himself unavailable or that he had
refused work without good cause. See letters from Alabama, Connecticut, Florida, Indiana,
Iowa, Michigan, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, and Utah.
The responses indicated that union considerations simply could not enter into the determi-
nation, and the South Dakota response relied explicitly on that state's right-to-work law,
prohibiting union security. California indicated that the applicant would be unavailable
under the circumstances posed, but that he might possibly have good cause for refusing
a placement if taking the new job would jeopardize his case.
An employee discharge is justified under the National Labor Relations Act if it is
"for cause." 49 Stat. 444 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1952). An employee
discharged for "cause" under the federal statute may or may not have been discharged for
"misconduct" under the state unemployment compensation act. See the South Dakota letter.
A discharge for "misconduct" is disqualifying. Comparisons supra note 53, at 93-95.
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the same time collaterally enforcing the Taft-Hartley Act is another
problem.
Protecting the Gains of the Union Movement
In accord with court decisions under Taft-Hartley and the minority
position at common law, the unemployment insurance statutes have been
interpreted to impose a sliding scale. 1 8 Under the usual interpretation,
the claimant must lower his sights as to wage and occupation after he
has searched for a job at his previous trade for a reasonable period of
time, and if re-employment in this trade does not appear probable.
Whether this interpretation points unemployment compensation toward
the subsistence standard of the poor relief law is a matter for speculation.
At this point, the problem is to determine whether the wage achievements
of the union movement can act as a brake on the application of the
sliding scale.
Analysis starts once more with the impact of the labor standards pro-
vision on the work refusal disqualification. To take a case falling within
the explicit terms of that section, a union man out of work may be offered
a job in an open shop, paying below the union scale. As a "condition" of
employment the employer may insist that he resign his union member-
ship. This "condition" is prohibited by the labor standards provision, and
the applicant may refuse the job as unsuitable. Perhaps the employer
offering the job may not insist on resignation, but the union may insist
that the employee forego his affiliation if he takes the open shop job
offered to him. Case acceptance of the employee's rejection of a job for
this reason is divided.
108 For typical cases see, e.g., Broadway v. Bolar, 33 Ala. App. 57, 29 So. 2d 687 (1947);
Claim of Jackson, 68 Idaho 360, 195 P.2d 344 (1948); Di Re v. Central Livestock Order
Buying Co., 246 Minn. 279, 74 N.W.2d 518 (1956); Halahan v. Riley, 94 N.H. 48, 45
A.2d 886 (1946); Breskin v. Board of Review, 46 NJ. Super. 338, 134 A.2d 730 (1957);
In re Shotkin, 4 App. Div. 2d 924, 166 N.Y.S.2d 923 (3d Dep't 1957). Pennsylvania has
vacillated in the application of this rule. For cases rejecting the proposition that the
applicant has a reasonable time to look for a job equivalent to his previous one see Merck
& Co. v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 184 Pa. Super. 138, 132 A.2d 727
(1957); Glen Alden Coal Co. v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 169 Pa.
Super. 356, 82 A.2d 64 (1951). These cases indicate that the "reasonable time" rule was
limited to the reconversion period following the second World War, and that applicants
now have to make an immediate readjustment, to a lower level if necessary. But cf.,
Cicerella v. Unemployment Compensation Bd of Review, 185 Pa. Super. 63, 137 A.2d
853 (1958); Reed v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 182 Pa. Super. 428, 128
A.2d 112 (1956); Glen Alden Coal Co. v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review,
169 Pa. Super. 124, 82 A.2d 74 (1951).
Labor has opposed the application of the sliding scale because it allegedly inhibits re-
employment by injuring self-respect and by dashing the hope that the previous status will
be maintained. Labor Looks at Unemployment Insurance 16-18 (Report of the Conference
Workshop of Organized Labor on Employment Security 1946). See also Loysen, "'Suitable
Work' for Unemployment Benefit Claimants," American Economic Review, Vol. 1, No. 6,
p. 9 (September-October, 1944) (history of the sliding scale requirement); Peterson, "Un-
employment Insurance in Colorado-Eligibility and Disqualification," 25 Rocky Mt. L. Rev.
180 (1953) (discussing basic interpretive problems).
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In terms of potential impact on the sliding scale, the union probably
condemns all open shops on the ground that their existence and rein-
forcement only weakens the union position in the long run. But the cases
approach the problem through the language of the statute. The initial
determination is whether a resignation required by the union, if the em-
ployee takes an open shop job, is a "condition" of the employment pro-
hibited by the labor standards provision. If not, the applicant could still
be awarded compensation on the ground that he had refused the work
with "good cause."'0 9
The cases are divided, the decisions rejecting the work refusal finding
either that expulsion from the union was not a condition imposed by the
employer or that the applicant did not have good cause,"' while the de-
cisions accepting the work refusal interpret the condition language dif-
ferently or find "good cause.""' Underlying the decision on the effect of
the union-enforced resignation, however, is a series of secondary con-
siderations that echo the test of the sliding scale. Some of the cases re-
jecting the work refusal point out that the nonunion job paid the union
scale," 2 or that the reasonable period during which the applicant could
refuse a downward adjustment had expired." 3 Similarly, cases accepting
the job refusal may point to the fact that the nonunion job does not pay
the union scale," 4 or that the applicant's chances of re-employment at a
109 The cases do not usually indicate whether the shop is "open" in the sense that no
union has been recognized by the employer as bargaining representative, or in the sense
that the union, though recognized, does not operate under a union security clause. How-
ever, in most instances the first meaning appears to be intended. For earlier discussions
see Menard, "Refusal of Suitable Work," 55 Yale LJ. 134 (1945); Note, 56 Yale LJ. 384
(1947). Constitutional objections to allowing the applicant to refuse nonunion work when
expulsion from his union will result are discussed in the Yale note.
1lo Bigger v. Unemployment Compensation Comm'n, 43 Del. 553, 53 A.2d 761 (1947)
("condition" must be imposed by employer); Chambers v. Owens-Ames-Kimball Co., 146
Ohio St. 559, 67 N.E.2d 439 (1946); Barclay White Co. v. Unemployment Compensation
Bd. of Review, 356 Pa. 43, 50 A.2d 336 (1947), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 761 (1947); Elnit v.
Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 168 Pa. Super. 158, 77 A.2d 668 (1951);
10:11203-Ga. A; 7:8893-Ga. A; 8:9145-Ind. A; 8:9412-Kan. A; 7:8547-Kan. A; 8:9802-
Mich. A; 12:13306-Miss. A, aff'd, Bd. Rev. #23-BR-48 (unpub.); 7:8637-Miss. A; SW
475.55-15 (Mo. B 1956); SW 475.55-5 (Nev. B 1953); 10:11669-Tenn. R. In some of the
cases the union would have imposed a substantial fine rather than expulsion, but these
instances are treated on the same basis, apparently on the assumption that payment of
the fine would prove difficult and expulsion would eventually result for this reason.
111 9:10415-Ark. AG; SW 475.55-11 (Conn. B 1954); 12:13508-Conn. R; 6:8177-Conn.
R; 8:9314-Fla. A; 7:8667-Fla. A, aff'd on other grounds, 7:8813-Fla. R; 8:9040-Ill. R;
3:2415-Iowa R, rev'd, District Court (unpub.); 12:13762-Ky. A; 10:11216-Ky. A; 9:10644-
Mich. A; 9:10196-N.J. R; AA 475.85-3 (Okla. A. 1952); 8:10135-Okla. R; 5:7211-Tenn. A;
6:8146-Va. A. Under the New York statute this result is reached because an applicant is
allowed to refuse a job when it would "interfere" with his union membership. 7:9004-N.Y.
R. See Appendix A.
112 7:8893-Ga. A; 8:9145-Ind. A; 8:9412-Kan. A; 7:8637-Miss. A; SW 475.55-15 (Mo.
B 1956).
113 8:9145-Ind. A; 7:8637-Miss. A. Cf., 7:8547-Kan. A (applicant had been union mem-
ber for short period).
114 6:8177-Conn. R; 8:9049-Ill. R; 4:6337-Ind. A (employer had been listed as unfair);
6:8223-N.C. R. Cf., SW 475.55-3 (Tex. B 1951) (nonunion job offered applicant paid
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union job are good.115 To the extent that these secondary considerations
are decisive, the per se objection to a nonunion job is not accepted. Either
the readjustment phase of the sliding scale rule is applied in spite of the
union's blanket condemnation, or the downgrading impact of the sliding
scale is modified only to the extent that the job offered represents a de-
parture from the union's own wage achievement.
An even better indication of the effect of union objections on the ap-
plication .of the sliding scale is furnished by those cases in which union
expulsion will result and the job is refused on the explicit ground that it
does not pay the union scale. Here the labor standards provision is again
potentially applicable on the grounds that resignation from the union is
a "condition" of the job offer, and the applicant may claim "good cause"
for rejecting the job. Under the labor standards provision the applicant
need not take a job paying less than the prevailing wage, so that if a job
paying below scale is also below the prevailing wage limit no construc-
tional problems are presented. Difficulties occur in the cases in which
the wage, though prevailing, is not the union scale."8 Since the statute
permits the applicant to reject a job that pays less than the prevailing
wage, by inference a job that meets this standard may be deemed suit-
able under the statute.
But the cases that have considered this question merely divide along
the same lines, and for the same reasons, as those cases in which the job
was rejected and expulsion threatened because the employment would be
in an open shop. Some of the cases accepting the applicant's refusal do
so without qualification,'1 7 but some apply the "reasonable adjustment
period" rule and note that the applicant had not been unemployed long
enough to force him to lower his sights."' In the cases rejecting the job
union scale but did not have same fringe benefits). Occasionally, reference is made to
the fact that the applicant has substantial rights in hospital and other benefits, accruing
because of his union membership, and that he is entitled to keep these. See 9:10644-Mich. A.
11 8:9314-Fla. A (job offered applicant paid union scale); 8:9049-Ill. R; 4:6334-Ill. R;
9:10196-N.J. R.
116 Many of the cases, however, indicate only that the wage is below union scale, without
indicating whether it is the prevailing wage for the locality.
117 9:10515-Ark. A; 2:2165-Ind. A (applicant offered prevailing wage); 12:13066-Mass. A
(even though union had raised his scale during applicant's unemployment period and
employers had not accepted new rate) ; 7:8693-Mass. A (job offered was under jurisdiction
of another union); 7:8691-Mass. A (same); 8:9506-Mich. A; 5:7280-Neb. R; 7:8996-N.J.
A, aff'd, Bd of Review Decision No. BR-5389 (unpub.); 7:8771-N.Y. R; 2:1472-N.Y. A
(union would have imposed penalty). Cf., 10:11688-Ariz. A (based, in part, on the fact
that applicant was not trained for the job that was offered him); 6:8177-Conn. R (union
agent told applicant that to accept work substantially below union scale would jeopardize
his getting work at union rate).
118 8:9791-La. A (applicant out of work for only two weeks); 8:9601-La. A (three
weeks); 8:9418-La. A (similar; union agent had refused to send applicant to work paying
less than union scale). Cf., Industrial Comm'n, v. Brady, 128 Colo. 490, 263 P.2d 578
(1953) (wages offered applicant found not to be prevailing); 9:11046-La. A (applicant
expecting re-employment).
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refusal, the fact that the time for a readjustment had arrived is some-
times considered." 9
When expulsion is threatened by the union if the claimant takes a job
that imposes conditions inimical to union objectives, an opportunity is
presented to resolve the conflict between union and statutory policy.
However, although some consideration has been given to the union posi-
tion, an undue concentration on the technicalities of the statutory lan-
guage has often prevented real analysis of the problems of integrating
the administration of the statute with the claims which the union has
advanced. 2 °
In somewhat similar cases the job offered to the claimant requires the
resolution of a conflict between the terms of the statute and a union-
negotiated collective bargaining contract. When the claimant rejects the
job because the wage is unsatisfactory his rejection is not accepted if the
wage has been set under the terms of the contract. 121 By analogy to those
cases in which the work refusal is accepted because the job offered pays
below the union scale, the decisions in this situation accept the union-
negotiated wage as evidence that the job offer is satisfactory. In other
cases the contract supports the claimant's rejection. Most commonly,
the problem has arisen in terms of job priority; the employee turns down
119 7:8567-Ark. A (job offered paid prevailing wage); 8:9106-Utah A, aff'd Industrial
Comm'n, Case No. 44-C-63 (unpub.); 9:10679-Wash. A (also noting that chances of
getting union work were remote). Both the Utah and Washington cases noted that expul-
sion at the behest of the union was not a "condition" of the job offered to the applicant.
For cases rejecting the applicant's work refusal for the same reason, without considering
the readjustment factor, see Speer v. Industrial Comm'n, 8:9761-Fla. Ct. D (Circ. Ct.)
(union agent had told applicants not to take the job); SW 475.8-1 (N.C. A 1949);
7:8453-Va. A.
120 In a few miscellaneous cases the decisions allow the claimant to reject the job for
union-connected reasons, when to take it would result in loss of union status. 5:7013-111. A
(applicant would have been subject to summary dismissal from new job, without benefit
of arbitration); 2:1994-Ind. A (journeymen would have lost union status if took job as
laborer); SW 475.55-13 (Ore. A 1954) (there was "trouble" between the union and the
employer who offered the job); 8:9367-Pa. R (employer offering job not under union
contract because he had taken kickbacks from employees). The cases recognize the reasons
for the refusal as "good cause" under the statute without much analysis of the implications
of the result. Cf. 2:1070-N.Y. A (manual work as strikebreaker found unsuitable for skilled
worker because it would affect his seniority and chances of re-employment in skilled
position). On the other hand, unreasonable union restrictions have been recognized as such
and have not been enforced. E.g., 6:8231-11. R (union forbade outside construction
worker from taking inside work).
121 5:7437-Ind. A; 10:11228-Mass. R; 7:8762-Mo. R, aff'd, Miller v. Unemployment
Comp. Comm'n, Circ. Ct. Jackson County, April 29, 1944 (unpub.). Sometimes the ap-
plicant is offered a job which pays a wage that has been negotiated by another union but
which is less than the wage commanded by the union to which the applicant previously
belonged. Nevertheless, the same result has been reached. 11:12685-N.J. R; 12:13627-
N.D. A. In the New Jersey case the commission, while admitting that the unemployment
compensation act could not be used to drag down living standards, and while stating that
a union man could reject a nonunion wage substantially below scale, held that its decision
was fortified by the policy of the NLRB to recognize only one bargaining union for each
group of workers. The case contains a lengthy and union-oriented discussion of the
problems under consideration.
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the job because it has been offered to him in violation of seniority pro-
visions.
While the cases divide, and while many recognize the limitations con-
tained in the union's agreement,'22 they are short on analysis except in
those instances in which expulsion from the union would result if the job
were taken contrary to orders. In the cases which do not give weight to
the union agreement the decisions usually say that the statutory provi-
sions mhst be given precedence. No analysis of the role of a collective
bargaining contract in unemployment compensation is undertaken. Since
the peaceful settlement of labor disputes through the negotiation of col-
lective bargaining agreements is the ultimate aim of federal statutory
labor policy, an accommodation of this policy with the unemployment
insurance act would seem to require the giving of some consideration to
the contract terms.
Finally, an opportunity for the assessment of the impact of union policy
on the compensation act is presented by cases in which the applicant
rejects job offers that impose conditions inconsistent with union objec-
tives, but in which the union has not threatened expulsion if the work is
accepted. Although the job may be rejected because it is nonunion, or
because it is below scale, the labor standards provision is not expressly
applicable because loss of union membership will not result if the job is
accepted. Only the policy of the labor standards provision may be ap-
plicable to give the applicant "good cause" to refuse the job offer.
Practically all of the decisions find that the applicant does not have
good cause to refuse a job for these reasons.'2 3 Perhaps this result is
122 In the following cases, the applicant's seniority did not entitle him to the job:
3:2496-Cal. A (would have led to expulsion from union); SW 475.05-7 (Conn. B 1954);
3:4227-Ind. A (crediting applicant's honest belief, including fear of expulsion from union);
3:4779-N.Y. A (work-rotation plan, disobedience would have led to expulsion from union);
3:2517-N.Y. A (same); 2:1300-Pa. A; 4:5120-Wis. A (would have led to expulsion from
union). Cf., 1:497-N.Y. A (applicant may reject work offered for only part of a week,
contrary to union agreement). See also the cases in which the loss of seniority rights in
the old job, if a result of the new employment, has been considered as a factor in justifying
the refusal. Industrial Comm'n v. Parra, 111 Colo. 69, 137 P.2d 405 (1943) (concurring
opinion); Hobbs v. Board of Review, 68 Ohio L. Abs. 369, 122 N.E.2d 707 (1953);
5:6897-Ill. A; 4:6393-Ind. A; SW 475.1-7 (Wis. A 1955) (involved in determination of
availability). Cf., Goings v. Riley, 98 N.H. 93, 95 A.2d 137 (1953) (applicant's availability
determined in part with reference to union contract provisions governing shift priorities).
In a few cases the contract provisions have not been controlling. SW 475.1-11 (Ky. B
1956) (with respect to dispute with employer over use of new machinery); SW 475.05-9
(Mich. B 1955) (with respect to suitability of job offer under the act) ; SW 475.1-13 (Ore.
B 1958) (similar). But cf., SW 475.1-3 (Mich. B 1954) (applicant bound by contract
provisions governing mailing of notice of recall). Compare ACF Industries, Inc. v. Industrial
Comm'n, 320 S.W. 2d 484 (Mo. 1959).
123 10:11100-Cal. A (work offered under jurisdiction of another union); 12:13282-
Fla. A (work offered nonunion, but applicant's union had made referrals to open shops);
8:9221-Ind. A (objection to nonunion job paying below scale considered as factor in
application of sliding scale); 2:2170-Mass. R (work offered was nonunion); 7:8497-Minn.
R (same; to uphold applicant here would discriminate against nonunion members);
10:11864-Miss. A (nonunion work offered at prevailing wage but below scale for union
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reached because of the lack of an objective manifestation of union dis-
approval, and the union's refusal to expel may indeed be taken as an
estoppel of the individual claimant. Additionally, refusals based on sub-
jective "good cause" may be viewed with suspicion, although the follow-
ing discussion of the contrary treatment of applicants rejecting jobs re-
quiring union membership somewhat negates this conclusion.
So far, the discussion has centered on the impact that union policies
and achievements have had on the work refusal requirement. All of the
cases that have been considered can also be handled under the "avail-
ability" test, and some of the cases of work refusal discussed above have
actually been disposed of on the basis of unavailability. At this point,
however, interest centers on the truer case of availability. The claimant,
when registering for employment, may restrict himself only to union
positions, or to jobs paying the union scale. Sometimes he agrees to be
considered for nonunion jobs outside his trade. As indicated earlier, since
the labor standards provision is applicable to a determination of avail-
ability, it might conceivably allow a consideration of union-oriented
objectives.
Almost uniformly, the decisions hold unavailable the applicant who
imposes restrictions of the type described above, although the agency
responses to a case of this type on the questionnaire indicate somewhat
greater leniency. However, the reasons for the finding of ineligibility are
varied, and many cases are difficult'to categorize because they turn on a
variety of factors. To the extent that the decisions can be generalized,
they indicate a decided reliance upon the availability provisions alone,
which do not in terms refer to union objectives. Since availability is often
taken to mean total exposure to the job market, in most cases in which
the applicant limits his availability to union jobs, or to jobs paying the
union scale, the finding of ineligibility is almost automatic.-
24
located in another community); 6:8113-N.M. R (work offered was nonunion),, SW
475.65-3 (N.Y. A 1951) (set aside on appeal; applicant contended that to take nonunion
work below scale would weaken union position in the industry); 9:10558-N.C. A (work
offered was nonunion); SW 475.65-1 (Ohio A 1950) (work offered at prevailing wage but
below scale); 11:13007-Pa. R (work offered at prevailing wage but in violation of rates
set by applicable contract); 10:11670-Tenn. R (applicant had moved to community where
union work not available); 8:9105-Utah A, aff'd, Industrial Comm'n, Case No. 44-6-63
(unpub.) (work offered was nonunion; can't consider personal attitudes of employee).
Cf. SW 500.7-13 (Colo. A 1951). Contra, 12:13723-Ore. A (applicant found unavailable
on other grounds). Cf., 9:10735-Mich. R (can refuse nonunion job because of honest belief
that loss of seniority and union membership would result). Compare SW 500.7-1 (Okla.
A 1949).
124 Mills v. Mississippi Employment Security Comm'n, 228 Miss. 789, 89 So. 2d 727
(1956) ; 12:13921-D.C. A; 7:8673-1I1. A (though refusal of work outside usual occupation is
with good cause when loss of union membership and benefits would have resulted);
8:9052-Ind. A; 7:8364-Mo. A, appeal dismissed, Comm'n Dec. No. C-1303 (unpub.)
(applicant limited herself to previous employer with whom she expected re-employment
in six weeks) ; 7:9010-Ohio R; 7:8708-Ore. A (union would not permit employment outside
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Other cases that find the applicant ineligible are willing to consider
mitigating factors in an appropriate case,2 5 one of the most important
of which is the degree of unionization of the job in question in the lo-
cality in which the work is sought. Both the cases and the agency re-
sponses indicate that if the area and job are substantially unionized the
restriction on availability to unionized positions might well be upheld.'
This approach would at least give weight to the extent of unionization as
a factor in the individual's job environment. The sliding scale and spe-
cific labor standards provisions are .additional considerations that enter
into a determination of these cases. Decisional attitudes toward the lim-
itation of availability to union work have been influenced by the length
of the applicant's unemployment and by his chances of rehire at his usual
union occupation,'2 7 and by the agency's attitude toward the threatened
usual craft during off season); 7:8398-Ore. A; SW 475.55-1 (Pa. B 1950); 7:8853-Pa. R;
12:13112-Tenn. R (dictum); AA 475.85-1 (Va. B. 1950); 8:9853-Wash. A. Cf. 8:9532-
Ore. A.Question #3 in the letter to unemployment compensation agencies put this problem in
terms of a market that was 50%o unionized for the job in question. See Appendix C.
Responses indicating an automatic finding of unavailability were received from Iowa,
Michigan, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and South Dakota.
In some of the cases the employee limits himself to, but is unable to find, union work
either because he has moved to an area which is not heavily unionized or in which the
union local, having jurisdiction, will not give him a work permit or exacts a waiting
period before it will do so. In these cases the decisions find the applicant unavailable,
treating the move as a voluntary disqualifying act on the part of the applicant. That the
decisions would credit an exclusionary local union rule is hard to understand. 7:8805-Cal. A
(local union would not give clearance); 5:7447-Conn. R (local union had waiting period);
8:9577-Fla. R; AA 475.97-7 (Ill. B 1951) (local union would not give license to applicant
and gave local members job priority); 8:9048-1Il. A (local union had waiting period);
10:11670-Tenn. R (applicant moved to community where only nonunion work available).
At the same time, many decisions fail to accept rules of the applicant's own union that
limit his availability. 7:8749-Ga. R (applicant allowed to look for work only through union
business agent); 7:8578-Ill. R (applicant not allowed to take off-season work outside his
occupation). Cf., SW 170.2-21 (N.Y. B 1954) (not good cause to refuse work not obtained
through union hiring hall). Perhaps the difficulty lies again in the statutory disapproval of
restrictions imposed by the applicant on himself.
125 Only a few cases made an automatic finding of availability. 7:8331-Mo. R (empha-
sizing applicant's long career as union carpenter); 9:10209-Pa. R. Cf., 7:8766-N.J. R.
126 In the following cases this was one of the facts supporting the decision: 8:9482-Fla.
A (area heavily unionized); AA 475.85-13 (Pa. B 1956). Similar opinions were given in
agency responses from Alabama ("substantially all" work in his occupation and locality
unionized), California (90%), and Florida (available unless work prospects considerably
reduced). The New York response was similar, indicating that the applicant was entitled
to reasonable personal preferences, and that the agency would want to know how manyjobs were foreclosed by this limitation.
For holdings of unavailability, proceeding from the same premise, in which there was
little unionization in the area, see Avram v. Appeal Board, AA 475.85-5 (Mich. Circ. Ct.
1954) (area 10%o unionized); 7:8905-Md. A, aff'd, Bd. Dec. No. 572 (unpub.) (based
in part on point that no local work available at union scale); AA 475.05-9 (N.Y. A 1954)(40% unionized and applicant limited job-hunting activities to union offices). Cf., AA
475.05-17 (W. Va. A 1958). The area was 90% unionized but the decision found the ap-
plicant unavailable, in part because he was only making efforts to find work through his
union.
127 Findings of availability based in part on short period of employment and reasonable
prospects of finding usual work at union wage: 8:9128-Cal. R; 8:9482-Fla. A; 8:10112-
Mich. A. For contrary decisions based in part on the same assumption, in which the
claimant's prospects were less sanguine, see 9:10252-Ill. R; 8:9221-Ind. A; 9:10338-Kan. A;
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union expulsion of an applicant who registers for a nonunion or below
scale job. If the union-imposed penalty is considered a "condition" of
employment, the applicant is held to be available, apparently on analogy
to the labor standards provision.'28
For the most part, even when the decisions have considered the im-
pact of the work refusal disqualification on the realization of union ob-
jectives and the protection of union achievements, they have not sup-
ported the union stand. This results from a tendency to give preference
to the general objectives of the compensation statute, even in work re-
fusal cases in which an application of the labor standards provision would
support the union-oriented position. An example is furnished by the
cases that apply the generally applicable sliding scale to an employee
who rejects a job offer because of a threatened union expulsion.
When the work refusal is approached in terms of availability, the
decisions appear explainable more in terms of the degree of individual
exposure to the labor market rather than the acceptance or lack of ac-
ceptance of the union objection. For example, most of the decisions have
found unavailable the applicant who is foreclosed from finding union
jobs because he has been suspended or expelled from his union for mis-
conduct or nonpayment of dues.' 29 These cases represent the approach to
availability indicated above, rather than a sympathy for union affairs.
Some of them emphasize that the applicant accepted the union's decision
without appealing, and on this basis appear influenced by the self-
imposed and voluntary nature of the restrictions on work.
Unionizing the Nonunion Employee
By way of contrast to the situations discussed in the preceding section,
the cases dealing with the nonunion claimant's refusal to take a job which
would require him to join the union give precedence to the claimant's
7:8905-Md. A, aff'd, Bd. Dec. No. 572 (unpub.); 11:12285-Mo. A; 10:11521-Va. A. Agency
responses emphasizing these considerations were received from Alabama, California, Con-
necticut, New Jersey (held available, but must take nonunion job offering union wage),
New York, and Utah.
128 8:9128-Cal. R; 9:10209-Pa. R. For cases where prominence was given to this fact see
8:10112-Mich. A; AA 475.85-13 (Pa. B 1956). Agency responses indicating that considera-
tion would be given to this factor were received from California and Connecticut. Contra,
Avram v. Appeal Board, AA 475.85-5 (Mich. Circ. Ct. 1954); AA 475.85-11 (Miss. A
1955). Agency responses from Ohio and Pennsylvania indicating unavailability relied on
court cases limiting the "condition" language of the labor standards provision to conditions
imposed by the employer. Conflicts in the Pennsylvania cases are apparent. Cf., 9:10252-
Ill. R (unavailable; union would not impose penalty); 7:9029-W. Va. R (similar).
129 6:8124-Colo. A; 2:1963-Ind. A; 2:2031-N.Y. A; 11:12167-Wis. A; 2:1556-Wis. A;
1:655-Wis. A. Contra, 5:7690-Cal. R; 3:3584-Mo. R; 3:3841-Mass. R. Cf., 8:9672-Ind.
A (relying on point that area not heavily unionized for this occupation). Contrast some
early Wisconsin cases, where the employee was laid off under the terms of a collective
bargaining contract or under a union demand that nonunion workers be laid off before
union workers. Nonunion employees who were laid off were found available because the
discharge came about through no act of their own. 1:432-Wis. A; 1:431-Wis. A; 1:298-
Wis. A.
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objections over the general policies of the compensation statute.130 Most
of the decisions accept the applicant's refusal to take a job requiring
union membership, and in some instances are willing to indulge in as-
sumptions contrary to those applied in the converse situation in which
the union member refuses a position because it will jeopardize his union
standing.
An example is furnished by the cases handling the refusal of a job
requiring union membership by applying the availability requirement.
Many of these. decisions turn upon such factors as the extent of union-
ization for the job in the locality, or the extent to which the nonunion
applicant has brought about his limitation to a market in which all or
most of the jobs in his trade are unionized.3 ' Other opinions recognize a
self-imposed limitation to nonunion work as a personal right, 32 or treat
the union shop as having been imposed by the employer who signed the
130 A brief survey of a problem that is tangential though somewhat related to the subject
under discussion lends support to the statement that the decisions proceed from the language
of the unemployment compensation statute, with little attention to labor policy. Often an
employee out of work is referred to a job under the jurisdiction of another union. Because
of inter-union jurisdictional conflicts, the employee's own union may not let him take the
new job unless he drops his previous union affiliation, which often the employee is reluctant
to do because of accumulated seniority and benefit rights. Instead of proceeding to an
analysis on the basis of public policy toward inter-union conflicts, the decisions have ac-
cepted or not accepted the work refusal in these cases for reasons similar to those already
discussed in connection with some of the other problems. For example, when the work
refusal is accepted, the decision may rely on the point that the labor standards provision
makes a job unsuitable if the employee would have to resign from his union to take it.
But it is doubtful whether this section was meant to be applied to inter-union conflict.
8:9305-Cal. R; 4:5283-Ill. A; 5:7199-Ind. A; 5:8180-Kan. A; 10:11547-La. A (improperly
applying "company union" proviso to excuse taking of new job under jurisdiction of other
union); 9:10368-Mo. R (applicants expected early recall); 9:10900-Mo. A (reasonable
prospects of securing work in usual occupation); 5:7206-N.H. A; 6:7911-Ohio A; 3:3240-
W. Va. A. Cf., Bowman v. Troy Launderers & Cleaners Inc., 215 Minn. 226, 9 N.W.2d 506
(1943) (contention raised but not considered); 7:8494-La. A (applicant would have lost
death benefits and would have had to pay large initiation fee to rejoin); 8:9247-N.J. A
(applicant would have lost prestige in old union).
When the refusal is not accepted, the decision may rely on the familiar ground that the
"condition" which requires the resignation is imposed by the applicant's own union and
not by the employer offering the job. 9:10333-Ind. R; 3-4405-Ky. A; 7:8890-Mo. A;
8:9266-Pa. A. Cf., SW 475.05-11 (Wash. A 1956) (no good cause; applicant did not want
expense of belonging to two unions). In a few cases this problem has arisen in the context
of a fight for recognition by two unions within the same plant. Members of the losing
union who have refused to affiliate with the winning union have been upheld on the ground
that the job required as a "condition" of employment that they forego membership in
their old union. 3:4218-Cal.; 2:908-Cal. (revised in unpub. opinion); 2:1975-Ore. A. For
a similar treatment of the same problem under the National Labor Relations Act prior
to the 1947 amendments see Rutland Court Owners, Inc., 44 N.L.R.B. 587 (1942). But
cf., Colgate-Palmolive-Peet Co. v. NLRB, 338 U.S. 355 (1949).
'31 Held available: 2:2045-Ind. A, modified, 2:2318-Ind. R (voluntary leave found);
9:10336-Kan. A; 6:7934-Mass. A (when available for other jobs in area). But cf., 8:9352-
N.J. A (union closed to Negro applicant); AA 475.97-1 (N.Y. A 1950) (same as to alien;
union operating closed shop illegal under federal law).
Held unavailable: 7:8807-Cal. R (most jobs in area unionized); 6:8082-Cal. R (same);
6:7932-Cal. A (applicant left nonunion community for locality where her trade was
unionized); SW 475.75-7 (Ind. B 1953) (dictum; if restriction forecloses too much work);
AA 475.5-3 (N.M. A 1955), aff'd, Comm'n Dec. No. 88 (unpub.) (market 100% unionized);
6:7747-Wash. A (same).
132 3:4803-Ind. A (prior to enactment of right-to-work law).
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agreement rather than by the applicant who puts the limitation on his
availability.13 3 Of course, union security has a history of lack of public
acceptance, which is currently reflected in the enactment of state right-
to-work laws. But the applicable statutory policy toward union security
is not much in evidence in the availability cases.134
Cases applying the work refusal disqualification to a turndown of
union security take much the same approach. Most of the decisions, with
little discussion, hold that the refusal of a job requiring union member-
ship is not a refusal of suitable work.3 3 Quite often the result is predi-
cated on a misapplication of the clause in the labor standards provision
allowing the applicant to refuse a job when he would be forced to join a
"company" union.3 6 By analogy to the National Labor Relations Act,
a "company" union under this clause would be one that is dominated or
assisted by the employer and that, accordingly, does not have an inde-
pendent status.3 7 These cases, however, apparently interpret the pro-
vision to mean a union established in a "company."
Reference to the personal "liberty" of the applicant to refuse a job
requiring union membership also appears.33 In these cases there are
more frequent attempts to reconcile unemployment compensation with
labor relations policy than in the cases in which the applicant seeks to
uphold the union. Especially since the reference may be to state rather
than federal labor policy, the consequences may be unfavorable to the
133 5:7512-Ore. A, an interesting case in which the applicant, in part, based her objection
to joining on religious grounds. Many of the jobs in her occupation in the area were not
unionized.
134 But cf., 8:9047-Ga. R. Among other restrictions, the applicant refused to take a
job in a union shop. He was found unavailable. Membership in the union was not required.
In view of the "constructive" union work of fifty years, work in a union shop was not held
unsuitable per se. But the same rule was applied to an open shop position, because the
unemployment compensation act dictates an attitude of neutrality toward the union
movement.
135 9:10864-Kan. A (work unsuitable); 9:10552-N.J. A, appeal dismissed, Bd. Rev.
No. BR-6090 (unpub.) (applicant has good cause to refuse) ; 10:11729-Ohio A (no "offer"
of work if applicant must join union). Cf., 7:8994-Mont. A (applicant could not afford
union dues and expected re-employment at nonunion job paying more).
In some of the cases there is an element of abuse of union security, either by the union
or by the employer. 11:12590-Ky. R (applicant not given reasonable time to pay back
dues); 3:2508-N.Y. A (union closed to applicant); 5:7040-Ohio A, aff'd, Bd. Rev. No. 474-
BR-42 (unpub.) (discrimination against nonunion employee); 3:3943-Wis. A (union
security agreement signed over heads of employees).
136 10:11452-Colo. A (dictum); 5:7367-Iowa A; 10:12042-Mont. A; 11:12527-Ohio A;
3:3720-Pa. A. In some cases the labor standards provision is admittedly applied by
analogy only. 2:2045-Ind. A, modified, 2:2318-Ind. R (employer cannot compel resignation
from union and so cannot compel membership either); 8:9374-Tenn. R. Appendix A lists
a few states in which the labor standards provision has been amended to make the job
unsuitable if the applicant is compelled to join any union, company or otherwise. These
provisions would authorize the work refusal. SW 475.75-3 (Minn. B 1951); 10:11235-
Minn. A.
137 16 NLRB Ann. Rep. 155-159 (1952).
138 Levinson v. Unemployment Comp. Comm'n, 6:8193-Mo. Ct. D (Circuit Ct.);
2:2045-Ind. A, modified, 2:2318-ind. R (voluntary leave found); 7:8845-N.C. R; 8:9374-
Tenn. R.
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union position. When a right-to-work law outlaws union security, a de-
cision permitting the applicant to reject a job calling for union affiliation
has easily been reached. 139 Even in the absence of such a statute the em-
ployee is upheld on the ground that the compensation act does not require
of him "positive acts" of union affiliation. 40 In other contexts many
positive acts are required as a condition of eligibility, not the least of
which is the active search for work.' 4 ' If the recognition of union security
agreements is in accord with legitimate public policy, then positive acts
relating to union membership might be required as well.
Unfortunately, those cases refusing to accept a work refusal on the
ground that the job requires union membership are also inadequately
reasoned. Some recognition is given to state and federal statutory sanc-
tion of union collective activity, which is extended to include a union
security provision of a collective bargaining contract. 42 Other cases are
usually content with the observation that the statute provides no explicit
excuse for rejecting the offered position. 143 Few attempts are made fully
to reconcile the policies of the unemployment compensation and labor
relations statutes.
SOmE CONCLUDING THoUGHTS
Work refusal tests permeate the law, private and public, governing
employer-employee relations. But in spite of their all-pervasiveness the
interpretive treatment of this requirement has been indecisive. A final
instance in which the role of the work refusal requires definition is illus-
trated in a new area of litigation that blends the policies of the National
Labor Relations Act and the common law. Wrongfully expelled union
members may be able to sue the union for damages under state law, and
recent United States Supreme Court decisions permit judicial enforce-
ment of the Taft-Hartley Act in state courts by employees who suffer a
discriminatory discharge,'144 whether employer- or union-instigated.'4 5
139 8:9987-Fla. AG. A similar result was achieved under the declaration of policy of
the applicable little Norris-LaGuardia act in SW 475.75-7 (Ind. B 1953). The statute states
that it is against public policy for the employer to force the employee either to join or
not to join the union. But the statute was later interpreted not to outlaw union security
clauses, even though it had been been applied to outlaw picketing for a closed shop on
the ground that this activity was indirectly coercive of the employees. Smith v. General
Motors Corp., 143 N.E.2d 441 (Ind. App. 1957).
140 3:4890-Ohio R (act requires policy of neutrality toward union membership).
'41 Supra note 53, at 84.
142 Beckert v. Administrator, 20 Conn. Super. 9, 119 A.2d 122 (1955) (noting local refusal
to enact right-to-work law); 6:8073-Iowa P. (dictum; but union must be open to
applicant).
143 6:7958-Cal. A; 4:6690-I1. R; 6:7909-Ind. A; 3:4228-Ind. A (union security clause
negotiated by employee's own union); 9:10645-Mich. A; 5:7708-Mich. R (refusal not
permitted by labor standards provision); SW 475.75-1 (Pa. B 1949). Cf., 10:11569-N.Y. A
(good cause for rejecting job not found under the facts); 5:7043-Ore. A (applicant would
not be required to join union).
144 Under the federal law an employer is authorized, under section 8(a) (3), to discharge
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So far, the few cases that treat the damages issue have been brought
against the union by former members whose expulsion has deprived them
of job opportunities, though not all of the decisions have involved em-
ployees subject to the federal law.
Potentially conflicting substantive law analogies confuse the role of
the work refusal test in the litigation of union expulsions. To the extent
that the union attempts to secure a discriminatory discharge in violation
of the Taft-Hartley Act, the policies of that law might be applicable.
When the action is brought under state substantive law an initial de-
cision must be made to determine whether the action sounds in tort or
in contract,146 although mitigation is required in either case and the
status of the union as a wrongdoer has influenced the courts to apply
common law principles favorable to the employee.'47 Furthermore, in one
lower court case brought prior to the Taft-Hartley amendments, the
court held that although the employee might have obtained employment
in an open shop she had a "right" to insist on the retention of her status
as a union member. 48
judicial handling of work refusals in actions brought by expelled union
members against their unions typifies the mixture of principles of privi-
lege, fault, and right that underly this area of the law. Thus, poor relief
is a "privilege" given to "sturdy beggars" whose unemployment has
an expelled union member only if his membership has been revoked for nonpayment of
dues and initial fees. It is also an unfair labor practice under section 8(b) (2) for the union
to attempt to induce a discriminatory discharge by the employer. Consider also the
provisions of a state right-to-work law which grants a cause of action in damages to the
employee who is discharged or denied employment under any form of union security. E.g.,
Ind. Ann. Stat. § 40-2706 (Burns Supp. 1959).
'45 International Association of Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617 (1958), discussed
in Lynch and Mandelker, "Private Enforcement of Taft-Hartley: A New Horizon in
Federal Preemption," 11 Okla. L. Rev. 406 (1958). Even though interstate commerce is
involved, the state cause of action is held not to be preempted, in part because it affords a
remedy different from that available under the federal act.
146 See International Printing Pressmen v. Smith, 145 Tex. 399, 198 S.W.2d 729 (1946)
(sounds in contract). Most of the state courts that have permitted the employee suit
in cases involving interstate commerce have proceeded on a tort theory. Lynch and
Mandelker, supra note 145, at 414. None of these has considered mitigation problems.
147 Harris v. National Union of Marine Cooks and Stewards, 116 Cal. App. 2d 759, 254
P.2d 673 (1953) (any uncertainties in the application of the mitigation rule were to be
resolved against the union as wrongdoer). In California the action clearly sounds in
contract. Smetherham v. Laundry Workers' Union, Local 75, 44 Cal. App. 2d 131, 111
P.2d 948 (1941) (although the court applied the majority common law rule on mitigation,
it also held that the employee should have kept a job in a nonunion laundry which, because
of inadequate wages, had been found objectionable. However, no comparison was made
with her wages in her previous employment). Williams v. Master, Mates & Pilots of
America, 384 Pa. 413, 120 A.2d 896 (1956) (the plaintiff was not compelled to go to
another city to seek work. The court also placed on the defendant union the burden to
prove that the plaintiff had failed to mitigate. These are the traditional common law
views).
148 Cheetham v. Local 222, United Garment Workers, 55 D. & C. 28 (Pa. C.P. 1945).
The decision appears predicated on the employee's financial interest in the union as well
as on her personal desire to maintain her union affiliation. The decision also appears
influenced by the court's characterization of the union as a "wrongdoer."
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often been thought to be their moral "fault." Unemployment insurance
compensates "involuntary" unemployment only, and common law mitiga-
tion contains presumptions working against the employer because of his
"wrongdoing" and because of the employee's "right" to continue in his
previous employment. As courts and administrators apply the fault char-
acterization to the employee or to the employer they tend to limit or
expand the area of discretion accorded employees in refusing offers of
new work. Perhaps the basic difficulty in those situations in which a work
refusal test is used is this failure to agree on which characterization
should be accepted, and this failure is in turn reflected in conflicting
reactions to employee rejections of new work for reasons related to
union affiliation.
Cases involving work rejections for union-related reasons have arisen
infrequently under the Taft-Hartley Act, but conflicts in unemployment
compensation between union policies and the statutory work refusal
requirement have developed over a wide range of issues. A resolution of
these conflicts in either context first requires a decision on the place
accorded employee discretion through the acceptance or rejection of
union objectives in the statutory scheme. Since the provisions of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act are protective of union activity, the admin-
istration of the work refusal requirement as part of the reinstatement
remedy afforded by that statute requires attention to this underlying
statutory purpose. From this perspective, concerted activities protected
by the statute ought not to lead to a finding of willful refusal to accept
work, so that a striking employee would be allowed to picket and collect
back pay. A job offer should also be refusable if it is vacant because of a
protected strike or because of employer unfair labor practices, as where
vacancies have been created following an unjustified employer lockout.1 4 9
How far the statute should protect the employee outside those areas
in which the statutory provisions are directly involved is open to question.
However, the entire statutory scheme favors the job refusal that is union-
oriented. For example, statutory recognition of the union shop 5 ° would
arguably support an employee rejection of a job not subject to union
security on the ground that the refusal is in furtherance of the statutory
objective. The statute also gives a preferred position to collective bar-
gaining,15 1 so that a sliding scale should not be applied to the employee
to the extent that the job offered pays less than the wage prevailing for
149 For the status of employer lockouts under Taft-Hartley see NLRB v. Truck Drivers
Local 449, 353 U.S. 87 (1957).
150 49 Stat. 452 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (3) (1952).
151 49 Stat. 452 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1952).
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similar positions under collective bargaining agreements negotiated in
the area.
The handling of union-based work refusals in unemployment com-
pensation presents more difficult decisions, since the compensation laws
are directed primarily to the fulfillment of other aims.5 2 To some extent,
statutory objectives disfavor the union member's position. Many feel
that unemployment compensation, like poor relief, should only provide
aid at a subsistence level, without regard to previous employment. Work
refusal requirements are also important in the prevention of fraud, 15 3
and union-oriented refusals that have only a personal basis must be
viewed from this perspective. The role of the work refusal requirement
in forcing wage and occupational adjustments must also be considered.'
If the program is intended to force the unemployed into the job market
regardless of prior work history, the protective mantle of union contracts
and union demands arising out of a prior job should not merit considera-
tion.
Most important, the basic statutory tension on the issue of union
neutrality remains to be resolved in view of the conflicting implications
of the labor disputes and labor standards provisions. Not only has the
intent of the labor standards provision sometimes been frustrated, but
its usefulness is questionable in view of the considerably more complex
policy of today's National Labor Relations Act. On the other hand, the
fact that the labor standards provision is federally required indicates
that some accommodation with federal labor policy is in order. This
article's review of current judicial and administrative decision has pro-
152 A parallel to the conflicting treatment of statutory labor policy in unemployment
compensation may be found in conflicting attitudes regarding the extent to which the
benefits of one program should be offset against the other. Unemployment compensation
benefits are not deductible from Taft-Hartley back pay awards. NLRB v. Gullett Gin Co.,
340 U.S. 361 (1951) (compensation benefits paid to advance collateral social purpose).
Many unemployment compensation statutes require deductions for workmen's compensation
or Federal Old Age and Survivor's Insurance benefits. Supra note 53, at 110-115.
Unemployment compensation payments have been held non-deductible from the employee's
recovery in his common law action. Billetter v. Poseil, 94 Cal. App. 2d 858, 211 P.2d
621 (1949); Bang v. Internat'l Sisal Co., 212 Minn. 135, 4 N.W.2d 113 (1942). Some
statutes prohibit the giving of poor relief to unemployment compensation recipients. Mich.
Stat. Ann. § 16.455(2) (c) (Supp. 1957). Compensation benefits are usually counted as
income under the prevailing administrative practice. Piffard, "Determining Eligibility for
General Relief," 80-100 (unpublished thesis in N.Y. School of Social Work, Columbia
University 1941).
153 See, generally, Becker, "The Problem of Abuse in Unemployment Benefits," 205-267
(1953).
154 Burns, Social Security and Public Policy 76 (1956). A general examination of the
work refusal test would also have to consider the relatively residual role of the state
employment services, to which compensation claimants are referred. A recent study indicates
that the services do not get the better jobs, with the result that referrals made by it were
bound to be downgrading. Becker, op. cit. supra note 153, at 78-80. See also Altman,
Availability for Work 55-73 (1950).
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ceeded on this assumption, and has indicated some dissatisfaction with
current interpretations.
A more satisfactory statutory structure is difficult to construct. If
work refusals in unemployment compensation were to be governed ex-
clusively by the National Labor Relations Act then the implementation
of statutory labor policy would take precedence over the other statutory
objectives of the work refusal requirement that have been outlined
above. Short of fully incorporating the federal labor law, however, the
compensation statutes could defer to it in a limited number of instances
in which a decision can 'be made that the unemployment compensation
law should give way. In all other cases the consideration of federal
labor policy would 'be put on a permissive basis.
Any change in this direction would probably have to proceed on the
assumption that the labor dispute disqualification is an accepted part of
the unemployment compensation scheme. The status of work refusals
arising out of strikes or in a context of union-management conflict that
have escaped the labor disputes disqualification can be clarified by
amendments to this section. Their immunity may either be continued or
abrogated. For example, the exemption from the disqualification of the
striker whose strike has been lost could be written into law. When the
labor disputes section is not made applicable, the law should clearly
qualify the applicant who is engaging in concerted strike activities that
have the sanction of the.federal labor law. While the employee may get
a double recovery if he is also entitled to reinstatement with back pay,
this possibility can only be obviated 'by a change in back pay policy that
might be willing to offset the unemployment benefit once the compensa-
tion statutes took better account of the federal labor law.
Outside the area of labor-management conflict the federal statute
could amend the labor standards provision to require a consideration
of the National Labor Relations Act. In addition, this provision could
require the consideration of union objectives applicable to work re-
ferrals, to the extent that they have the sanction of federal law. Although
this task is made difficult by the ambivalence toward work refusal policies
evident in decisions reached under the NLRA itself, a congressional
rewriting of the labor standards clause would at least put the decision
at the federal level where it belongs.
Of the present state unemployment insurance statutes, the New York
law most incorporates these suggestions. Under the labor standards pro-
vision of that statute a job may be refused as unsuitable if its acceptance
will "interfere" with the retention of union membership or if it pays a
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rate that tends "to depress wages or working conditions."', 55 The statute
sanctions the claimant who rejects a job offer because the union will
expel him if he accepts it, and it has been construed to authorize the
rejection of a job that pays a prevailing local wage that nevertheless is
substandard in terms of industry or state-wide employment levels.1 56
However, it leaves uncovered many of the situations discussed in this
article.
Further amendment of the present minimal federal labor standards
provision might first differentiate between those cases in which the im-
plementation of federal labor policy is thought to require a mandatory
finding of unsuitability and those cases in which the consideration of
union objectives can be left to the discretion of the state unemployment
compensation agency. In either event, of course, the provision would be
applicable to a determination of availability as well as to the specific
work refusal disqualification. At first, mandatory unsuitability could
be limited to those cases presently within the clause-jobs open because
of a strike, jobs paying less than the prevailing wage, and jobs requiring
the employee to abandon his union membership. As administrative ex-
perience is gained with the newer and non-mandatory factors affecting
suitability, they might be elevated to the mandatory list. At the outset,
however, some alteration of the present provision relating to union mem-
bership is in order. The statute should be expanded to add those cases
in which union expulsion would result regardless of what the employer
requires. While this step would give the union the right of veto, it can
be justified as being in line with federal statutory sanction of union
membership. A fair interpretation would permit the employee to abide
by organizational requirements once he has made the decision to join.
To avoid the difficult problem of projecting the unemployment com-
pensation agency into a dispute on union rules, this clause might com-
promise with a caveat authorizing disregard of a union expulsion when-
155 N.Y. Labor Law § 593 (2) (a) (Supp. 1958). As originally introduced in the House,
the labor standards clause apparently contained language identical to the New York law.
Statement of Dr. E. E. Witte, Executive Director, Committee on Economic Security, in
Hearings on H.R. 4120 Before the House Committee on Ways and Means, 74th Cong., 1st
Sess. 138 (1935). The change to the "condition" language lends support to decisions finding
a refusal of suitable work when only the union would insist on expulsion.
156 In the reported administrative decisions the "depress wages" standard has not usually
been given independent consideration. E.g., SW 500.7-45 (N.Y. A 1955), aff'd, Bd. Dec.
No. UCFE-6 (unpub.); 8:9928-N.Y. R; 1:624-N.Y. A (seemingly equated with "prevail-
ing wage" standard). But a prevailing wage was held unsuitable because it paid less than
the state statutory minimum and would therefore "depress" wages. 6:7765-N.Y. R. Cf.,
SW 500.7-7 (N.Y. A 1949) (less than federal minimum; wage offered apparently con-
sidered "depressing" and less than "prevailing"). See also SW 500.7-53 (N.Y. A 1957).
A wage that was prevailing for the claimant's segment of the industry was apparently
considered "depressing" because it was lower than the wages earned by half of the
employees working in the entire industry.
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ever the union member involved would be authorized to seek reinstate-
ment under applicable state law.
Among the non-mandatory union considerations affecting suitability,
the state unemployment agencies would be authorized to consider the
extent to which a job vacancy shows an employer violation of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act,157 such as discrimination based on union
affiliation, bad faith bargaining, or an interference with union concerted
activities. In view of the federal statutory sanction of collective bar-
gaining, no job would be suitable if it were offered in an area that was
substantially unionized for the job in question and, whether organized
or not, if it imposed conditions that were inconsistent with local contract
provisions arrived at through the process of collective bargaining. This
standard would modify the sliding scale to the extent that it would au-
thorize compensation claimants to reject jobs paying less than the union
rate. However, it would sanction a rejection of a job in an unorganized
shop only to the extent that it imposed conditions less favorable than
those gained in the organized segment of the industry. This is an arguable
compromise. Employees under the National Labor Relations Act now
have the right to refuse to engage, as well as to engage, in concerted
union activity, although the Act remains firm in imposing the duty to
bargain when there is a union representative. Looking at substantial
unionization in the job area as a type of majority employee decision to
engage in collective bargaining, the statute would at least be justified in
taking the terms of the typical collective agreement as a proper test of
suitability under these circumstances.
Under this approach, a job not subject to a union shop clause would
not be suitable if a majority of the contracts affecting similar jobs in the
area contained such provisions. Inasmuch as the union shop has also
been validated by the federal law, a job offered subject to a union shop
provision should be deemed suitable unless a permitted state right-to-
work law158 is applicable.' 59 A final saving clause should be included,
making the labor standards provision inapplicable in any case in which
the union has gone out on strike, and in which the labor dispute dis-
157 The state or federal statute, if this approach is adopted, will have to resolve the
interstate commerce problem. If a congressional rewriting of the labor standards provision
is attempted, the new standards would be applied to all industries subject to the unemploy-
ment compensation program. Since the unemployment insurance title of the federal law is
an exercise of the taxing and not the interstate commerce power, no constitutional problems
would be present. Any other approach might have to attempt a differentiation between
businesses affecting and businesses not affecting interstate commerce. The difficulties inherent
in this distinction give additional force to demands from some quarters for the imposition of
federal standards throughout the unemployment insurance program.
158 49 Stat. 457 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 164(b) (1952).
159 Cf., SW 475.75-5 (N.Y. A 1952) (applicant has good cause to refuse job subject
to union security clause that does not meet conditions of Taft-Hartley Act).
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qualification would be imposed, even though the policy of the federal
law may be frustrated. So drawn, the statute would strike the best
balance possible between the policies of the federal labor relations act
and the accepted statutory disqualification of the striking employee
engaged in concerted activities protected by the NLRA.
In another context in which the work refusal requirement is poten-
tially applicable, a trial judge remarked that to use a program of public
aid to force a man to take an "unusual occupation" would constitute
involuntary servitude.160 Since the employee faced with a decision be-
tween working at a distasteful occupation and forfeiting reinstatement
rights or unemployment benefits cannot really be said to have a choice
free from external compulsion, perhaps no limitations should be placed
on employee decisions to reject job offers unless compelling public neces-
sity demands it to be otherwise.'' At least when the job offer runs con-
trary to union objectives that have been given statutory sanction, room
should be made for the acceptance of employee job refusals that are
predicated on this orientation. Under Taft-Hartley, the protection of
union aims has been found to predominate. In unemployment compensa-
tion the proposals that have been advanced' 62 would permit the state
agencies to classify as unsuitable the most common job offers that run
contrary to union objectives that have received federal statutory sanc-
tion. Detailed statutory prescription, however, may go only so far. In
the other instances, an employee decision to reject a job offer for union-
connected reasons will probably have to trust to a more favorable inter-
pretation of statutory "good cause."' 63
160 Hommel v. Hommel, 22 N.Y.S.2d 977 (Dom. Rel. Ct. 1940). The plaintiff had sued
for support from his child under the applicable family support provision in the local poor
law. The court considered a contention that the plaintiff was not entitled to support because
he had refused work. Cf., 3:2755-Ind. A (claimant contended he did not have to take
job that was humiliating to him).
161 This discussion has assumed that the denial of unemployment compensation is a
factor affecting the individual's choice of job. This assertion has been both affirmed, "Labor
Looks at Unemployment Insurance" 18 (Report of the Conference Workshop of Organized
Labor on Employment Security 1946), and denied, Becker, op. cit. supra note 153, at 293-
298. One observer claims that the evidence on this point is simply not available. Altman,
op. cit. supra note 154, at 251, 252.
162 There is congressional precedent for a similar work refusal policy in the provisions
of the Federal Railroad Unemployment Insurance Act quoted at note 55, supra, and which
are incorporated in somewhat altered form in the writer's suggestions.
163 Another perspective on the problems discussed in this article is provided by Great
Falls Employers' Council, Inc., 123 N.L.R.B. No. 109 (1959). After contract negotiations
between the union and the Council broke down, the union decided to use "whipsaw"
tactics, striking each of the employers one at a time. Immediately, the non-struck
members of the Council locked out their employees. As the locked out employees might
have been eligible for unemployment compensation, the non-struck employers offered
temporary intermittent employment sufficient to disqualify them.
In a 3-2 decision the Board held these tactics unjustified and found the non-struck
employers guilty of unfair labor practices, in part under section 8(a) (3). The majority
opinion held the combined lockout and temporary rehire unjustified by the fact that
unemployment benefits would be charged back to the employers, who would thus be
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APPENDIX A
STANDAR, D AND NoN-STANDARD WORK REFusAL PROVISIONS IN
UNEMPLOYENT COMPENSATION
1. Availability. Except for the New Jersey law, none of the statutes relate
the availability requirement specifically to the union context. The New Jersey
law provides that an employee is still available though on vacation, provided
the vacation is not due to his "own action" but rather to "collective action of
a collective bargaining agent or other action beyond his individual control."
N.J. Rev. Stat. § 43:21-4(c) (Supp. 1958).
2. Refusal to Work Disqualification. Wisconsin has enacted the sliding
scale into law. Wis. Stat. Ann. § 108.04(8) (d) (1958). There are no other
explicit modifications of the work refusal disqualification that are applicable
to union problems.
3. Labor Standards Provision. This provision is required in state laws
by Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 3304(a) (5), which provides in full text:
"Compensation shall not be denied in such state to any otherwise eligible indi-
vidual for refusing to accept new work under any of the following conditions:
(A) if the position offered is vacant due directly to a strike, lockout, or
other labor dispute;
(B) if the wages, hours, or other conditions of the work offered are sub-
stantially less favorable to the individual than those prevailing for
similar work in the locality;
(C) if as a condition of being employed the individual would be required
to join a company union or to resign from or refrain from joining
any bona fide labor organization."
Some of the state laws modify the federal statute by expanding or contracting
the applicability of this section to jobs that result in the loss of union mem-
bership:
Del. Code Ann. tit. 19, § 3315(3) (1953): "... would be denied the right
by the employer to retain membership in and observe the lawful rules of
any such organization."
Mass. Ann. Laws c. 151A, § 25(c) (3) (1957): "...• would abridge or limit
his right to join or retain membership in any bona fide labor organization or
association of workmen."
Ohio Rev. Code § 4141.29(D)(1) (Supp. 1957): "... would be denied
the right to retain membership in and observe the lawful rules of any such
organization."
Kansas and South Dakota have substituted the words "labor organization"
for the word "company union" in clause C. Kan. Gen. Stat. § 44-706(c)
(1949); S.D. Laws 1955, c. 62. Minnesota has substituted the word "union."
financing the strike indirectly. They reasoned that responsibilities under the federal labor
law could not be made contingent on state unemployment compensation provisions. The
minority vigorously disagreed, finding that the possible payment of unemployment benefits
to strikers was relevant to the position of the lockout under Taft-Hartley.
Since the offer of temporary employment constitutes an unfair labor practice under these
circumstances, it could be refused under the type of unemployment insurance statute
suggested in this article. While this case raises a chicken-and-egg type of problem that is
difficult to resolve, the minority opinion at least recognizes the necessity of accommodating
statutory policies in those areas where the two laws touch.
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Minn. Stat. Ann. § 268.09(1)(5)(b)(3) (West 1947). These statutes have
adopted the interpretation which allows a non-union claimant to reject a job
requiring union membership.
Finally, two states have generalized the labor standards section by adding
provisions additionally protective of the claimant:
Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 341.100 (Baldwin 1955): ". . . if the acceptance of
such work would be prejudicial to the continuance of an established employer-
employee relationship to which the worker is a party."
N.Y. Labor Law § 593(2): ". . . (a) acceptance of such employment . . .
would interfere with his joining or retaining membership in any labor organi-
zation . . . [or] (d) the wages or compensation or hours or conditions offered
... are such as tend to depress wages or working conditions."
APPENDIX B
DESCRIPTION OF THE UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION BENEFIT SERIES
1. Pre-1950: Bound Volumes. Prior to 1950 the Benefit Series was issued
monthly and bound annually in a series of twelve volumes. The cases were
numbered serially, and were published without the names of the parties. A
set of symbols was used to indicate the body making the decision. These
symbols were as follows:
AG-Attorney General
Ct. D-court decision
A-lower appeal tribunal
D-higher appeal body making decision considered as initial determination
R-highest appeal body
The following form of citation has been used: 8:9928-N.Y. R. The reference
is to a decision of the highest New York appeal body, which is case number
9928 in volume 8. Since the decision volumes were issued between 1938 and
1950 the date of the decision has been omitted as it can be calculated from
the volume number.
2. Post-1950: Loose Leaf Service. Since 1950 the Benefit Series has been
published as a loose leaf service. Decisions for the current and preceding years
are kept in the service, while decisions from prior years are removed to annual
transfer binders. The service is arranged by categories. Cases are still published
without the names of the litigants, and each decision is placed within the
category that is most applicable. Each case is cited by the identifying category
symbol, category section, and page number. Thus the citation, AA 475.05-13
(W. Va. 1958) refers to a case on page 13 of section 475.05 of the Able and
Available category. The symbol for Suitable Work cases is SW; these include
the work refusal disqualification decisions. Labor dispute disqualification cases
are carried under the symbol LD. Dates are given for post-1950 cases since
the citation does not indicate whether the case can be found in the current
service or in a transfer binder.
The symbols identifying the body making the decision are substantially the
same as in the pre-1950 series, with the following changes:
1. The symbol B has replaced the symbol R to indicate the highest appeal
body.
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2. The symbol D has been dropped.
3. The symbol I is used to indicate an administrative interpretation. No
symbol was used by the pre-1950 series in this instance.
Since the conversion to the loose leaf service the number of cases reported has
dropped considerably.
APPENDIX C
QUESTIONNAIRE TO STATE UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION AGENCIES
Several cases raising problems of union objectives and responsibilities were
included in a questionnaire sent to twenty-five state compensation agencies.
These states are as follows: Alabama, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecti-
cut, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Massachusetts, Michigan, Min-
nesota, Missouri, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylva-
nia, South Dakota, Utah, Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin. Replies were
received from the following thirteen states:
Alabama: William A. Major, Director, Unemployment Compensation Agency
(January 16, 1959).
California: Maurice P. McCaffrey, Principal Counsel, Department of Em-
ployment (January 2, 1959).
Connecticut: Joseph J. Gibbons, Executive Director, Employment Security
Division, Labor Department (December 15, 1958).
Florida: Charles M. Mann, Director, Unemployment Compensation Division,
Industrial Commission (December 23, 1958) (two staff members pre-
pared answers).
Indiana: C. J. Martz, Chief of Benefits, Employment Security Division (De-
cember 12, 1958) (answering case 11 only).
Iowa: Don G. Allen, General Counsel, Iowa Employment Security Commis-
sion (December 12, 1958).
Michigan: Max M. Horton, Director, Employment Security Commission
(January 9, 1959).
New Jersey: Clarence F. McGovern, Counsel, Board of Review, Division of
Employment Security, Department of Labor and Industry (April 14,
1959).
New York: Stephen Mayo, Director, Field Operations Bureau, Division of
Employment, Department of Labor (December 12, 1958).
Ohio: Beman S. Pound, Director, Bureau of Unemployment Compensation
(December 31, 1958) (questions referred to legal section).
Pennsylvania: John M. Clark, State Director, State Employment Service,
Bureau of Employment Security, Department of Labor and Industry
(December 11, 1958).
South Dakota: Allan Williamson, Commissioner, Employment Security De-
partment (December 16, 1958).
Utah: Fred E. Dremann, General Counsel, Department of Employment
Security, Industrial Commission (January 29, 1959).
Although the responding states are primarily industrial, the geographic rep-
resentation is fair and some non-industrial states are included. In addition, the
responding states had 58%o of total average weekly insured unemployment in
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December, 1958. Current Operating Statistics, Social Security Bulletin, Vol.
22, No. 3, p. 30 (March, 1959).
Letter-Questionnaire to State Unemployment Compensation Agencies
At present I am conducting a study of the availability and refusal
of suitable work provisions of state unemployment compensation laws.
My primary interest is the treatment that has been given to refusals
by claimants on the ground that to take the offered job would interfere
with their responsibilities and obligations to their union and to the
union movement. While I have had access to the administrative deci-
sions reported in the Benefit Series, I am also interested in obtaining
from a selected number of states a sampling of agency policy.
To ascertain how your agency would handle the work refusal and
availability provisions in this area of interpretation I have constructed
a series of hypothetical fact situations, which follow. Would it be
possible for members of your staff to prepare a brief and informal
"opinion" on each of these, indicating how the case might be handled
and giving reasons why? I am interested primarily in how the case
would be handled on the administrative level. Applicable appeals
determinations, if any, are of interest, but in the absence of precedent
I would appreciate an assessment of current agency policy.
Availability, Work Refusals and Union Relations: Hypothetical Cases
Note: Different individuals are involved in each case.
1. (Pending NLRB charge). Claimant has worked for several
years at the X Company which has not been organized. Recently the
Y Union has started an organizing campaign in the plant. Claimant,
who was active in the campaign, was fired. He claims that the firing
is an illegal discharge for union activities under the federal Taft-
Hartley Act. He has filed an unfair labor practice charge with the
National Labor Relations Board, which is pending. The company says
that he was discharged for incompetence. Claimant applies for un-
employment compensation and is offered a job at another, non-union
plant. He refuses it as unsuitable on the ground that to take any job
will jeopardize his case before the NLRB and will, in effect, destroy
the purposes of the federal labor relations act.
2. (Employer union history). Claimant is offered a job with the X
Company. He refuses it as unsuitable on the ground that the employer
has a negative union history. Specifically, he has in the past been
found guilty of several unfair labor practice charges under the federal
statute, including a failure to bargain with the certified union in the
plant, and a lockout which was found to be an interference with the
employees' right to organize.
3. (Availability; union restrictions). Claimant is a member of the
X union. In registering for work he restricts his availability to em-
ployers having union contracts. He will not take a job in a non-union
shop even though it pays the union scale. About half the jobs in his
occupation are unionized in his locality. Is claimant available?
4. (Claimant on strike). Claimant, together with his fellow union-
ized employees, has struck the X Company for higher wages and
better working conditions. During the strike he was permanently
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replaced and the plant has re-opened and is operating at full capacity.
Claimant and many other members of the union are still on strike and
are still picketing. The employer then offers the claimant another
job in the plant which is the equivalent of his old job, but that carries
the same terms and conditions that were in effect before the strile.
Claimant refuses the job as unsuitable.
5. (Claimant active in union affairs). Claimant has a long history
of activity in union affairs. However, most of the jobs in his occupa-
tion in this locality are not unionized. He has been working for the
X Company for some time. Together with his fellow employees he
struck the company for recognition. While on strike he has been an
active leader on the picket line and in other strike activities. He has
registered for work, and the union has indicated that strikers are free
to take other jobs. However, employers to whom the claimant has
been referred refuse to talk with him after learning who he is and that
he has been an active union organizer. Is the claimant available?
